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Lessons From Koizumi-Era Financial Services Sector Reforms 
Financial Services Sector Reform in Japan 
Abstract 
Japan’s “lost decades of growth” owe to insufficient countermeasures to address (a) 
demographic changes and (b) belated and incomplete adaptation of the services sector in 
particular to globalisation.  The combination of a strong bureaucracy, a high level of per-
capita GDP at the outset and redistributive dynamics between industrial sectors have 
softened the impact of deflationary shocks but allowed policy immobilism to flourish.  The 
Koizumi reform agenda was successful in resolving Japan’s banking crisis, and endeavoured 
to capitalise on this success to go beyond financial services reform, and to implement capital 
market reform. 
Why examine Koizumi’s 2006 reforms? 
Koizumi’s reform agenda was part of a long (still ongoing) process of financial reform.  The 
2006 reforms were those most focused on the opening of capital markets and represented a 
far greater opportunity for much-needed structural reform than actually took place. 
To understand the context of these reforms and gauge their degree of success or failure 
(thereby learning lessons in the process), it is necessary to have a working understanding of 
several things including: 
(1) Characteristics of Japan’s postwar political economy. 
(2) The influence of these characteristics upon Japan’s postwar history of financial 
reform 
(3) The overall economic context of Japan’s “lost decades” 
It is worth bearing in mind that while financial sector reform may have been an objective in its 
own right until the bursting of Japan’s real estate and stock bubbles in 1990, the over-arching 
goal of structural reform thereafter became one of extricating Japan from its deflationary “lost 
decade” dynamics therafter.  The latter proved extremely difficult and lent to negative 
evaluations of structural reforms in the post-bubble era. 
What were the reforms? 
The 2006 reform package included: 
• The Financial Instruments and Exchange Law 
• New Companies Law 
• Postal Privatisation 
What did they intend to achieve? 
• Market-opening (greater cross-border investment, particularly inward investment) 
• Better corporate governance through capital market opening 
• A move “from savings to investment” – diversification of household balance sheets 
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What was the outcome? 
The 2006 market reforms were successful in overcoming a degree of policy immobilism but 
were ultimately incapable of resolving Japan’s “lost decades” of growth, particularly given the 
2008 Lehman shock. 
There were some individual policy successes as well as valuable lessons learned from the 
2006 Koizumi reforms. Limited progress on capital market reforms in various subsequent 
administrations after Koizumi tended to place disproportionate focus on the negative aspects 
of the reforms’ outcome.  Japan’s relapse into “lost decade” dynamics alongside the global 
financial crisis only underscored the necessity to press ahead with structural reforms to 
achieve eventual sustainable economic recovery. 
Ultimately, financial and capital market reforms represented advancements but not enough to 
solve the entire economy’s problems. 
Lessons for APEC  
Lessons from the 2006 reforms as applicable to APEC include:   
 The complementarity of capital market reforms to reforms in financial services 
 Policy sequencing: economic expansion makes structural reform via income 
redistribution more palatable   
 
 Benefits in expansion of new products may be sought to offset compliance costs 
associated with harmonisation to global regulatory standards in financial systems. 
 
 Idiosyncratic application of the rule of law is a potential hurdle for cross-border M&A 
into Asian economies 
 
 “Mandatory” corporate governance regimes might be more transparent than 
“enabling” regimes in the eyes of foreign investors 
 
 Given the greater role of non-shareholding stakeholders in many Asian models of 
governance, there may be merit in collectively exploring alternative models to Anglo-
saxon governance models. 
 
 Strong and centralised political leadership may be a pre-requisite to achieve success 
when battling vested interests to enact reform  
 
 Gradualist or piecemeal financial reform agendas run the risk of falling behind global 
trends - failing to achieve desired reform or even exacerbating crisis risks 
 
 
1. The need for structural reform in Japan 
As of 2001, Japan had experienced its first “lost decade” of growth.  Although it was 
generally agreed that policy reforms were required, policymakers were divided on the 
substance of such reforms.  Prior to the Koizumi administration, Japan’s consensus-
driven policymaking process did produce hard-won reforms at great cost, which amid 
frictions among stakeholder interests were implemented in stuttering, piecemeal fashion.  
 
  
- 3 - 
Koizumi’s reformist credentials are not to be overlooked, even if in implementation his 
reforms failed to rescue Japan from its “lost decades”.  It is argued that, if not for the 
onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007, the postal privatisation (PM Koizumi’s 
crowning legislative 
victory) would have 
changed the face of 
Japan’s financial system.1  
The New Companies Act 
represented the first major 
revision to corporate law 
since the early 20th 
century, striving to 
modernise Japanese laws 
surrounding corporate 
mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) and therefore to 
fuel growth in cross-
border investment.   The 
Financial Instruments and 
Exchange Law (J-SOX, 
as commonly known in 
the US) was designed to 
comprehensively overhaul 
Japan’s outdated 
Securities and Exchange 
Law taking into account 
regulatory changes in the 
United States2 and, by establishing a regulatory “level playing field” to encourage inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 
As a result of the GFC, the Tohoku Tsunami in 2011 and their impact on the Japanese 
economy (Japan’s relapse into deflation) these reforms have been widely dismissed as 
failures.  Yet summary dismissal overlooks elements of progress in financial sector 
function and productivity.  
 
A more nuanced assessment of the programme is necessary, starting with the political 
and economic contexts of the reforms. 
1.1. Political economy of the Japanese financial sector:  
The Japanese financial system displays structural idiosyncrasies whose roots lie in recent 
political and economic history.  In evaluating the success of structural reform in Japan, it 
is insufficient simply to hold up isolated examples of policy reform to comparisons with the 
US or UK.  Instead, it is necessary to take into account characteristics of Japan’s model 
of stakeholder capitalism, in which suppliers, employees, business partners and 
financiers alongside shareholders are all viewed as important business stakeholders.   
                                                 
1 (Vogel 2006) 
2 In the wake of Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, US Congress enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed on 30 July 2002, under the oversight of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.” 
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf 
Timeline of Reforms under PM Koizumi 
 
 April 2001: PM Koizumi comes to power 
 June 2001: CEFP under Koizumi & Takenaka 
compile first centralised economic and fiscal policy 
guidelines 
 Sep 2001-Apr 2002: FSA inspections to reclassify 
non-performing loans at troubled institutions 
 Jan 2002: Bank Shareholding Purchase Corporation 
established (Purchased 1.6trn yen of stocks by 
2006) 
 Oct 2002: PFR (Programme for Financial Revival) to 
accelerate bank loan restructuring. 
 April 2003: IRCJ established 
 April 2004: Economic expansion has begun 
 September 2004: Takenaka is appointed Postal 
Reform Minister 
 March 2005: Major banksform MinisterMinister 
Reform Ministerg.Purchased 1.6trn yen ond of the 
banking crisis 
 October 2005: Postal reform legislation is enacted. 
 May 2006: New Companies Act comes into force 
 June 2006: FIEL is enacted 
 September 2006: PM Koizumi steps down per LDP 
rules 
  
- 4 - 
The Japanese model, born of an era of far less flexible financial policy, is not without its 
benefits – including stability throughout the supply chain and plentiful private-sector 
support for innovative R&D.  However, among other rigidities, the shareholder’s power to 
drive change is much blunted in comparison to the US shareholder.  Existing 
stakeholders may see insufficient benefits to the US model to abandon the Japanese 
model wholesale.  Thus protection of stakeholders’ interests may remain a structural 
characteristic of the Japanese economic model that will not disappear.  If so, it would be 
realistic for Japan to seek alternative models of structural reform than that of pure 
shareholder primacy. 
In order to understand the motivations behind structural reform in Japan in the 2000’s and 
the challenges reforms faced, it is useful to consider several key developments in the 
Japanese postwar financial system, including:  
• Japan’s rigid postwar financial system was characterized by a high degree of 
interventionism, which helped mobilise resources in Japan’s high-growth era yet at a 
cost to the efficiency of decentralised market functions.  As Japan’s economy 
matured and global financial markets internationalised, domestic fiscal and monetary 
policy alone were inadequate in regulating liquidity flow and assuring productive 
asset allocation across sectors.   
• The pains of adjustment to globalisation led to market-opening reforms in the 1980’s 
that, in the absence of complementary regulatory and administrative reform, proved 
incomplete.  The incomplete nature of market-opening reforms in the 1980’s 
contributed to market failure. 
• The necessity for comprehensive reform had become clear from the early 1990’s, 
upon the bursting of Japan’s real estate and stock market bubbles.  Indeed, these 
market shocks led political and business leaders to question the existing Japanese 
economic model.  
• In the mid to late 1990’s “Big Bang” deregulatory reforms, intended as market-
opening measures, were unable to resolve the main problems of loss of confidence in 
the Japanese financial sector, which was aggravated by the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997.  Deregulation and structural reform proved to be two separate phenomena.  
• Meanwhile, an aging demographic combined with regulatory forbearance3 prolonged 
Japan’s financial crisis. Japanese productivity growth plummeted.  
 
See Appendix 5 for a detailed 
account of Japan’s postwar history 
of financial reform and Appendix 6 
for a structural description of 
Japan’s financial sector. 
1.2. The economic problem 
While financial sector reform may 
have been an objective in its own 
right until the bursting of Japan’s 
real estate and stock bubbles in 
1990, the over-arching goal of 
structural reform thereafter became 
one of extricating Japan from its deflationary “lost decade” dynamics thereafter.   
 
                                                 
3 (Hoshi and Kashyap 2011) 
 
Figure 1: Japanese GDP growth (real vs nominal) 
Source: Statistical Handbook of Japan 2016, p. 23 
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By 2001, when PM Koizumi came to power, productivity had taken a large hit, 
particularly in the more domestic portions of industry (in the services sector, which 
comprises over 70% of Japanese GDP and jobs).  Moreover, with the financial 
sector beset by problem loans, loose monetary and fiscal policies were having little 
impact in rescuing Japan from its deflationary spiral.  Nor was export-oriented growth 
proving successful in extricating Japan from its economic malaise.  
 
Industry-level decomposition of Japanese growth accounting is illustrative in 
pinpointing structural problems from an economic perspective.    
 
The slump in Japanese productivity that occurred during the “lost decades” was 
accompanied by increased divergence between industrial sectors. Manufacturing 
displayed textbook characteristics of a “balanced growth path”, in contrast to 
services.  Although it may seem counter-intuitive (given the trend toward offshoring 
production was greater in the manufacturing sector), labor’s share of income showed 
an unhealthy decline in services, where capital’s share surged. 
 
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the (largely domestic) services sector 
substantially underperformed TFP in (more export-oriented, less regulated) 
manufacturing.  But under-performance in the non-IT sector with respect to IT was 
greater still, suggesting that mercantilist export-led growth strategies were not the 
only explanation behind the failure of domestic demand to recover.  
  
Further empirical research reveals the importance of technological investment in 
Japanese productivity growth.  A simulation by Fink (2015) incorporating Investment-
Specific Technology (IST) achieves an even better fit with actual data than the 
 
Figure 2: Heterogeneity in Japanese growth accounting, 1973-2008  
Source: (Fink, 2015) 
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Hayashi-Prescott “base case” model.   Fink finds that IST explains roughly one-third 
of productivity growth since 1970.4   
 
Meanwhile, for both IT and non-IT sectors, allocation to “innovative capital” matters 
for total factor productivity growth, above and beyond overall investment in capital, or 
even in intangibles.   This is a result robust across a number of econometric studies 
(see Appendix 1).  Separately, econometric analysis also reveals that increases in 
productivity are consistent with deregulation in the non-IT services sector in 
particular (Fink, 2016).   
 
The combination of analytical findings support the argument that regulatory 
incentives should be designed not only as to boost allocations to innovative capital 
but also to reallocate capital away from non-innovative “dead weight” capital, which 
dulls productivity.5   
 
With regard to the financial sector in particular, it is demonstrated (see Appendix 1) 
that between 2005 and 2008 (following a period of financial deregulation), the 
financial sector’s investments in intangibles as a proportion of gross value added 
(GVA) surged by almost 5%, with innovative capital accounting for a high proportion 
of intangibles, a mix consistent with improvements in total factor productivity (TFP).  
 
In practical terms, empirical results underscore the importance of strengthening 
corporate governance.  Where corporate governance influences the allocation of 
firm assets, improved governance, by way of improving asset allocation, ought to 
lead to higher productivity.  Improving corporate governance is also consistent with 
deregulation of highly regulated industries, also empirically consistent with growth in 
services-sector TFP. 
 
Appendix 1 presents empirical analysis on drivers of Japanese total factor 
productivity.   
 
1.3. The structure of the Japanese financial sector 
As of 2012, financial services represented roughly 3% of gross output and a similar 
percentage of compensation of Japanese employees.  Examining input-output tables, 
the greatest immediate impact of changes in financial services outputs is greatest upon 
the following industries: 
• Housing 
• Activities not elsewhere classified 
• Finance 
• Real estate 
• Railway 
• Rental of office equipment and goods 
• Wholesale 
• Retail 
• Other services for businesses 
                                                 
4 (Fink, 2015) 
5 (Fink, 2016) 
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Input-output analysis of the financial sector however, has limitations in analysis of structural 
reforms’ potential impact on the macro-economy.  As of 2012, bank lending accounted for 
less than 30% of nonfinancial firms’ financing, with capital markets providing most of the 
balance.  
It is certain that there is a great discrepancy between access to capital markets among large 
and small firms, particularly within the services sector (see Appendix 6 for further details).  
However, small firms, 
many of them suppliers to 
large firms, are also more 
dependent on inter-
business credit, which 
accounted for nearly 
13.9% of nonfinancial 
firms’ financing. 
The role of Japan Post in 
Japan’s financial system 
as a savings and 
investment institution 
underscores the pivotal role of indirect financing for Japanese firms.  Even though Japan Post 
Bank is not a corporate lending institution (remaining subject to the rigid segmentation of 
public financial institutions), it is Japan’s largest savings institution and deposit taker, with 
over JPY200trn in assets as at March 2016.  Over 40% of its assets are allocated to 
Japanese Government Bonds (JGB’s), and over 20% are liabilities against the financial 
sector; 8% of its balance sheet is dedicated to local government and corporate bonds.  Japan 
Postal Insurance holds an additional 81.5 trillion yen in assets.  Privatisation of these 
institutions brings with it the prospects of greater diversification of their balance sheets away 
from JGB’s and into risk assets, providing from private firms’ perspective greater domestic 
supply of capital market financing. 
This is one substantial limited factor, in our view, of input-output analysis of the financial 
sector.  A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model may be superior in analytical power 
when measuring the instantaneous impact of financial services reform upon the economy.   
But as we have argued above, narrow reform to financial services is insufficient on its own (in 
the absence of accompanying capital markets reform) to offer the optimal market solution in 
terms of financial intermediation.  In the presence of capital market reforms however, it is 
important to capture interest rate dynamics, structural change in capital markets and 
interaction with monetary and fiscal policy.  A Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model 
might provide a more complete analysis of realised and potential benefits of comprehensive 
financial and capital markets reforms, including interactions with cyclical (monetary and fiscal) 
policies.  
See Appendix 6: Current structure of the Japanese financial sector for further descriptive 
details on the structure of the Japanese financial services sectors. 
 
  
Figure 3: The Koizumi Reform Agenda 
Key reforms 
1. Financial system reform 
2. Postal Privatization 
3. Labor reform 
4. Promotion of FTAs and agricultural reform 
5. Deregulation through special zones 
6. Local public finance reform (“Trinity” reform) 
Source: (Hoshi and Kashyap, Why Did Japan Stop Growing? 2011) 
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2. The implementation of the Kozumi reform agenda: 
Key points: 
• The greatest strengths of Koizumi’s reform credentials lay in the combination of 
institutional structure, ability to capitalize on its own successes, efficient use of 
prior reforms, and policy sequencing. 
• Financial sector reforms of 2002-2004 under Koizumi and financial reform 
minister Heizo Takenaka were largely viewed to have resolved Japan’s financial 
crisis, allowing some recovery in financial sector productivity. 
• After building a track record with the resolution of the financial crisis and reflating 
the economy, the Koizumi-Takenaka team focused on a combination of reforms 
to capital markets and regulatory reforms necessary to re-invigorate the newly 
recovered financial sector with the aim of restoring its regional and global 
competitiveness.  
• The radical aspect of Koizumi’s reform program was the legislation of market-
liberalising reforms (Postal Privatisation) that challenged not only bureaucratic 
power but also vested interests within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 
• Instrumental in Koizumi’s reforms was its institutional structure. Notably, the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) was a pivotal body in the drafting, 
successful legislation and implementation of reform measures.6  
• Reflationary conditions not only made structural reforms more palatable, but they 
helped achieve other economic targets (such as fiscal reform). 
• Despite his radical reform program, Koizumi stopped short of transforming Japan 
into a US-style liberal market economy.  In the context of Japan’s postwar history 
of financial reform, this is not surprising. 
 
 
Successful elements of Koizumi reforms 
The Koizumi reform agenda included several controversial items: cabinet 
appointments based on merit rather than seniority; breakup of the highway 
corporation and reductions of “wasteful” spending on public works; a cap on public 
borrowing; devolution of both power and responsibility from central to local 
governments, and resolution of non-performing loans in the banking sector.  
The majority of these items were either overt or indirect challenges to MOF interests.  
Yet the truly radical component of the reform agenda was not its overt challenge to 
bureaucratic power, but its challenge to vested interests within PM Koizumi’s own 
political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).   This manifested most clearly in 
his plans for privatisation of Japan Post.  Even the mandarins of the MOF had 
historically little say over this behemoth institution, whose regional offices were 
bastions of LDP political support.  Koizumi’s willingness to challenge not only 
                                                 
6 Established in 2001 by PM Yoshiro Mori to emulate the Council of Economic Advisors in the 
US, the CEFP served as a vehicle to devolve power from the Ministry of Finance (which 
previously held greater sway over the compilation of budgets) to the Prime Minister’s office.  
The CEFP was chaired by the Prime Minister and included up to 11 members including the 
Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, the BOJ Governor and up to four 
independent private-sector experts.    The CEFP served to consolidate the Prime Minister’s 
control over economic and fiscal policy (Mulgan 2013).   
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bureaucratic but also political vested interests won him credibility abroad, amid 
expectations that he would introduce "globally standardized capitalism”7 
 
Effectiveness of the CEFP under Koizumi and Takenaka 
Koizumi’s reforms did not arise in a vacuum.  Rather, they were built on the 
foundation of reforms enacted by his predecessors, particularly PM Hashimoto’s 
electoral and administrative reforms, legislated in 19948 and PM Mori’s establishment 
of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP).  
Indeed, much of Koizumi’s success in giving rise to change owed to his efficient use 
of the CEFP, established in 2001.  The CEFP was one of the four councils directly 
established by PM Mori under the Cabinet Office Establishment Law9, and was 
responsible for compilation of Honebuto no Houshin or “Big Boned Policy”, central 
policy guidelines compiled annually to drive economic and fiscal policy priorities.  
In the words of Peter von Staden, the body was pivotal to the transfer of power from 
kanryo shudo (bureaucratic leadership, axiomatic under the convoy system) to kantei 
shudo (leadership from the prime minister’s residence).10   As a result, Koizumi’s 
administration received the credit for “[breaking] down the old fashioned and well-
entrenched system of administrative guidance that was a pillar of traditional Japan.”11 
In a 2006 report, the APEC secretariat lauded the CEFP as: enhancing the 
“consistency and comprehensiveness of economic policymaking”, enabling of “policy 
achievement evaluation and feedback to new policymaking” and as a driver of 
“transparency in the decision-making process” and finally for acting “as a driving force 
to promote the structural reforms of the Koizumi cabinet”.12 
Staffing was one of the greatest merits of the CEFP under Koizumi.  Heizo Takenaka, 
appointed by Koizumi as Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal policy in 2001, 
who included private sector expertise in the formulation of policy.  The CEFP 
coordinated its reform agenda with the FSA’s “Program for Structural Reform of 
Securities Markets” in August 2001, in order to facilitate a “transition from preferential 
treatment of savings to preferential treatment of investment” (popularly known by the 
policy slogan “from savings to investment”).  The Program provided the basis the 
2006 Financial Instruments and Exchange Law.13 
Capitalising on early successes (Resolution of the Banking Crisis) 
The reform program that led to the resolution of Japan’s banking crisis started in 
2002, when Heizo Takenaka was appointed Financial Reform Minister and head of 
                                                 
7 (Sakai, Japan’s Economy in the Post-Koizumi Era 2006) 
8 (Shinoda 2013), p. 79 
9 (Mulgan 2013), p. 76 
10 (Hook 2010); Peter von Staden cites Estevez-Abe (2006) in pointing out that “Reform in 
favour of a ‘Westminster system’ was one of the most significant structural changes that 
Koizumi brought to political decision making and by extension, the business and government 
relationship,” p. 169 
11 (Sakai, Japan’s Economy in the Post-Koizumi Era 2006) 
12 (APEC Secretariat 2006) 
13 (Summary of the "Front-Loaded Reform Program" 2001);  
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the Financial Services Agency. 14  In his reform plan, Takenaka capitalised on prior 
reforms to compel disclosure of Non-Performing Loans (NPL’s) on bank balance 
sheets15.  In September 2001 the CEFP set up a plan for corporate restructuring, in 
cooperation with the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ), the Resolution and 
Collection Corporation (RCC), and the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) 16 which 
laid the ground for Takenaka’s pivotal six point plan for NPL disposal.17 
Under Takenaka’s guidance, government capital injections softened the blow of 
select bank failures (formerly impossible under the convoy system).  Troubled firms 
were encouraged to restructure via the Industrial Revitalisation Corporation of Japan 
(IRCJ).  Financial institutions were consolidated as a less systemically damaging 
alternative to failure; 13 city banks that emerged in the early 1990’s were merged to 
form 4 megabanks.  Harmonisation with global standards progressed under the 
FSA’s guidance on disclosure and capitalisation per BIS regulations.  Securities firms 
were consolidated under the umbrella of large banks (both domestic and foreign), 
leaving Nomura as the only large independent player.  The insurance industry 
consolidated.   
Importantly, the plan met its two-year goal to halve Bank NPL’s by 2004. In fact, 
major banks lowered their NPL ratio from 8.4% in March 2002 to 1.8% in March 
2006.  The achievement was lauded by APEC as an exemplary case of structural 
reform,.18  
Building on reflation and 
early success of bank 
reform 
By 2006, the stock market had 
troughed, and mild inflation 
had taken hold, prompting 
optimism among consumers 
and investors that Japan had 
left its lost decade behind.  
Slumping productivity growth 
that had hit the services sector 
particularly hard post-bubble, 
had begun to improve.19  
Assisted by solid global 
expansion, the longest 
expansion in postwar 
Japanese history allowed Koizumi to achieve a number of his stated goals without 
great effort. 
Koizumi’s successes on manifold fronts after the end of the banking crisis taught a 
lesson on policy sequencing.  The upturn in the economy had not only assuaged the 
                                                 
14 (Hoshi and Kashyap, Why Did Japan Stop Growing? 2011) 
15 The NPL disclosure mandate had already been cemented in 1999 (see Big Bang reforms, 
above) alongside the establishment of the Financial Services Agency (FSA). 
16 (Japan Cabinet Office 2001) 
17 (Japan Cabinet Office 2002) 
18 (APEC Secretariat 2006), section 2.2.3 
19 (Fink, Heterogeneity in Japanese TFP, Part 1: Why Overcoming Deflation Alone is Not 
Enough 2015) 
 
Figure 4: AA credit spreads decline as equities rebound  
Source:  Nakashima & Saito (2007)  
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pains of reductions in public works spending and labor reforms, but had also boosted 
fiscal coffers beyond the MOF’s initial targets, and in 2006 the government looked as 
if it were on track to achieve its goal of primary balance by 2010.20  
A significant reflationary cycle provided favourable conditions to put in place the less 
popular reforms of Koizumi’s manifesto.  
 
Figure 5: Corporate bond issuance remains stagnant 
Source: JSDA 
 
This was convenient, given the need for structural reforms remained ever-apparent. 
Despite the pick-up in lending growth after the resolution of the Japanese banking 
crisis, progress in capital market development had stagnated.  Lacklustre foreign 
inward investment and risk-averse household balance sheets were ripe targets for 
growth-enhancing incentives by way of structural reform. 
                                                 
20 (Yumoto 2003)  The main contributor to the accelerated improvement in fiscal coffers was 
corporate taxes.  Firms who had previously posted insufficient profits to pay corporation tax 
had started becoming profitable, thus going from a 0% to 40% tax rate.  Importantly, banks 
(whose deferred tax assets had delayed their taxpaying status) were central among firms 
newly paying tax at this stage.   Source: Discussions with Japan’s Ministry of Finance, 2005 
(Fink) 
  




As Koizumi’s signature 
reform, privatisation of 
the Japanese Post 
Office was of both 
practical and symbolic 
value.  Postal 
privatisation was the 
most radical and thus 
contentious reform 
proposed by PM 
Koizumi. 
In form, postal privatisation backed both the administration’s commitment to transfer 
economic activity from the public to the private sector and concretised its policy slogan 
“from savings to investment”.  Yucho (postal savings) balance sheets remained inflated 
by deposits and cash that had flowed in from households when Japan’s “lost decade” 
was in full swing and sentiment was at its worst (see Figure 6: Historical ratio of Postal 
Savings in household balance sheets).  
Japan’s trading partners in the region also welcomed privatisation.  The goal of ensuring 
“equal footing with the private sector” promised to dilute the existing predominance of 
Japan Post in the financial and insurance sectors, which previously conformed to 
APEC’s description of “natural monopolies that are protected from strong competition by 
large start up costs” and “ineffective structures that allow anti-competitive behaviour 
[that] may act as a barrier for firms” (APEC Secretariat 2006).  
In substance, postal privatisation was the most direct challenge to intra-party factions 
within the Liberal Democratic Party (habatsu). Japan’s Post Office, since its birth at the 
time of the Meiji Restoration, was a powerful political lobby group, representing 
conservative interests in regional Japan.21  Its Postal Savings and Insurance arms are 
formidable publicly owned competitors and remain massive employers in financial 
services and insurance. 
Over the course of Japan’s modern history, Japan Post held direct policymaking 
influence in the form of seisaku zoku “policy tribes” or groups of Diet Members who 
specialised in specific policy affairs within the framework of the LDP’s Policy Affairs 
Research Council.   Even the MOF’s powerful gyōsei shido guidance system had 
declined historically to interfere with interests controlled by LDP’s policy tribes.  
Postal reform and its inherent challenge to status quo occupied a priority position on the 
Koizumi agenda from the start; in the CEFP’s first Honebuto no houshin in 2001, 
“Privatization/ Regulatory Reform-Maximizing Use of the Private Sector” occupied the 
top spot among his seven programs of structural reform following the resolution of the 
non-performing loans problem.   
                                                 
21 Japan Postal Savings was established in 1885, initially modeled on UK Postal Savings. 
 
Figure 6: Historical ratio of Postal Savings in household balance sheets  
Source: Japan Statistics Bureau, Europacifica 
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To drive the reform initiative, Koizumi appointed his reform czar Heizo Takenaka as 
Postal Reform Minister in September 2004.  Takenaka’s postal reform proposal 
(promulgated, incidentally, without the approval of the LDP) was to: 
1. Divide Japan Post into four independent companies, each in charge of network 
services, postal services, savings and insurance 
2. Divide Japan Post into regional companies 
3. Establish a holding company 
4. Establish a private corporate body to succeed the public company 
Privatisation was to take place by end of fiscal 2006 (April 2007).  Following 
privatisation, Takenaka proposed application of commercial laws to all new 
corporations, and establishment of an oversight body.  Takenaka’s plan was greeted 
with resistance at almost every stage, both from LDP zoku, opposition parties, the 
Minstry for Internal Affairs and Communications (headed by Taro Asō) and Japan Post 
itself (represented by Japan Post president Masaharu Ikuta).   
The postal privatisation bill survived parliamentary boycotts to gain Lower House 
approval in July 2005 by a narrow margin of 233 to 228, but was defeated in the Upper 
House thanks to the rebellion (dissent or abstention) of thirty Diet Members.  In a bold 
move, Koizumi called a snap election and dissolved the Lower House, strategically 
choosing high-profile candidates to run against thirty-seven dissenters within the LDP 
(popularly known as Koizumi’s “assassins” campaign).  On September 11, Koizumi won 
by a landslide, at once winning a mandate for postal reform systematically removing 
policy reform opponents from influential political posts, finally enacting the legislation on 
October 11th 2005.   
In legislating postal privatisation, Koizumi successfully capitalised upon 1994 electoral 
reforms (promulgated in 1996) to consolidate legislative power22, finally turning the 
tables on vested interests, weakening their influence and instead pursuing a market-
opening agenda.23  
The Japan Postal Services Holding Company was established in January 2006, which 
APEC aptly lauded as a “major achievement” (APEC Secretariat 2006).  The 2006 
postal privatization referendum should have changed the face of Japan’s financial 
system.  However, given in part the end of Koizumi’s turn as Prime Minister, the longer-
term fate of his signature reform would prove much less revolutionary than their 
legislation. 
 
2.1. The New Companies Act, which came into force in May 2006 to replace the 
existing Commercial Code, found its roots in a series of reforms starting in 2001, 
spearheaded by the judiciary. These were the first major changes to the Commercial 
Code since the Meiji era (1868-1912) and focused upon: 
 
1. Improving corporate governance 
2. Updating the law to reflect technological developments (particularly in 
information technology) 
3. Improving corporate fundraising availability and access. 
4. Updating company law to reflect the internationalisation of corporate and 
                                                 
22 (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2007) 
23 (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2007), p. 21 
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financial activities 
5. Modernising and streamlining corporate law24 
 
In form, the Act brought made available to enterprises previously unavailable financial 
structures, including the acquisition and sale of treasury stocks, stock 
exchange/transfer, corporate splits and takeover bids.25 
 
Points relevant to corporate governance standards and specifically to new regulations 
dealing with cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) were most representative of 
the Koizumi agenda of market-liberalising reforms and harmonisation with global 
standards.  With regard to corporate governance, the Act distinguished between large 
and small companies, with larger firms required to adopt a strict internal control system 
based on board resolutions. 
 
The need for improved corporate governance had been made especially apparent by 
global investors, whose investment into Japanese capital markets surged from the 
deregulations of the1990’s onward.  Cross-shareholdings, the dearth of independent 
directors and discouragement of shareholder derivative suits did little to protect minority 
shareholders.26   
 
It is remarkable to note that legislating these reforms did not require the same firebrand 
legislation as postal privatisation.  MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
the predecessor to the current Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) had been 
calling for improvements to corporate governance (such as the appointment of external 
directors) since the mid-1990’s.  Notwithstanding, bureaucratic support for legislation 
targeting corporate governance did not necessarily make legislation friendlier to foreign 
investors.  Rather, their participation diluted the substance of the reform. 
 
Examining why this was, it is pertinent to note that the intended beneficiaries of 
corporate governance under the commercial code are not the shareholders first and 
foremost, but all stakeholders.  Indeed, peppered throughout the legislation are 
references to the interests of the stakeholder27, which at times are at odds with those of 
shareholders.  On top of this, the legal framework in Japan (even after reforms to the 
outdated Commercial Code) leaves substantial room for interpretation.  Putting these 
together, the Ministry of Justice is given substantial discretion to arbitrate these 
conflicts, without the underlying assumption of shareholder primacy. 
 
A particularly contentious element of legislation was the “triangular merger” provision 
under which the Japanese subsidiary of a foreign firm can exchange shares of its 
foreign parent for control over a Japanese company.  On one hand, the provision was 
the first official recognition of cross-border M&A in Japanese law, but on the other it was 
met with (and diluted by) a slew of anticipatory bureaucratic guidance, the “Guidelines 
for Defending Corporate Value”28, released in 2005.  These were, in the tradition of 
                                                 
24 (Takahashi and Shimizu 2005) 
25 Takashi Ejiri, Asahi Koma Law Offices (2004) 
26 (Spedding 2009) 
27 利害関係人 (rigaikankeinin or “interested parties”) in Japanese Law traditionally refers to 
stakeholders including business partners, employees, and suppliers, etc. as mentioned in 
section 2.1 
28 There was some confusion of triangular mergers with hostile takeovers (when in fact, the 
law precludes the use of triangular mergers for hostile takeovers without board approval from 
the target company). 
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bureaucratic guidance, extrajudicial standards, which were upheld by courts as if it were 
law.   
  
In implementation, fear of hostile takeovers imposed a much less market-friendly 
solution than originally intended. Bureaucratic guidelines created a wedge between 
supply and demand in the market for corporate control.  In the eyes of international 
participants in the market for listed shares, Japan fell short of instituting best corporate 
governance practices upheld by transparent rule of law. The result has proven a hurdle 
for inward foreign direct investment, which to this day remains muted.  The linkage of 
the hostile takeover stigma with M&A regulation is illustrated below with the Livedoor 
and Bulldog Sauce case studies.   
 
The Corporations Act of 2006 was a work in progress and springboard for ongoing 
reform, as manifold subsequent revisions showed.  Its legislation was also 
complementary to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, enacted in June 2006. 
 
2.2. The Financial Instruments and Exchange Law (FIEL) 
The FIEL, legislated in 2006 and implemented in September 2007 was the final step 
in a series of market-opening reforms falling under the category of “from savings to 
investment” reforms.29  This class of reforms built on the recent market-opening 
measures of the Big Bang reforms in the late 90’s, and in so doing focused on the 
improvement of sales channels and financial infrastructure and also sought to attract 
a diversity of investors (particularly cash-heavy households), with some success.  A 
rise in the number and volume of complex financial products and transactions 
resulted.30   
 
The FIEL was, in form, an update to the existing Securities and Exchange Law, 
aimed at keeping up with developments in global financial markets, also protecting 
investors by means of adequate disclosure and stringent measures against unfair 
trading practices.  Aspects of FIEL (commonly referred to as J-SOX in the US) 
attempted to harmonise regulation with international standards, notably with the 
recently-implemented Sarbanes-Oxley regulaions in the US.  The broader objective 
of these reforms was to establish an adequate regulatory environment to implement 
Koizumi’s market-opening reforms31 and was intended by the Financial Services 
Agency to promote Japan’s status as a “Financial Services Nation”.32 
 
The FIEL also sought to streamline regulation; outdated regulatory codes such as 
the Financial Futures Trading Act, the Act Concerning the Regulation of Investment 
Advisory Services Relating to Securities and the Act Concerning Foreign Securities 
Firms were supplanted by FIEL.  Other codes, such as the Commodity Fund Act, 
were updated to reflect FIEL. 
 
There were four key changes that came from FIEL33: 
 
                                                 
29 These reforms included the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and 
Reform (June 2001); the Program for Structural Reform of Securities Markets (August 2001); 
and the Program for Promoting Securities Markets Reform (August 2002).  
30 (Japan Securities Research Institute 2014) 
31 http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/fiel/ 
32 http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newse/e20041224.pdf 
33 (EVANOFF 2015) 
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1. Expansion of the range of regulated financial instruments, to include investment 
trusts and collective investment schemes; the scope of regulated “derivatives 
transactions” was broadened to include interest rate and currency swaps, 
weather derivatives and credit derivatives. 
2. Establishment of more stringent regulations for broker/dealers of high-liquidity 
securities than low-liquidity securities, and for general investors versus 
professional investors. 
3. The J-SOX component, which sought more stringent disclosure by issuers of 
listed equity and bonds as well as external auditor certification of the issuers’ 
internal controls on financial reporting. 
4. Rules for bidders and target companies in tender offers, in form designed to 
ensure “fairness and transparency in market transactions”.  
 
In substance, some aspects of FIEL facilitated financial activity and others acted as a 
restraint.  Exemplifying the former, FIEL did away with the need for special 
authorisation to conduct business in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market,.  
Considerable compliance costs were also associated with FIEL, which on top of new 
regulations also imposed new reporting requirements – the Quarterly Reporting 
System, the Internal Control Reporting System and the Certification by Management 
System. 
 
For a concrete example where FIEL presented an expanding financial sector with 
compliance costs, it is useful to examine the market for investment trusts. Distribution 
channels for investment trusts were on an expansion path after 2005, in anticipation 
of postal privatisation.  Under FIEL however formerly exempt investment advisory 
firms were required to register under the provisions of the new law, increasing 
registration and reporting requirements, hence compliance costs.  Nonetheless, the 
investment trust market ultimately benefited from the harmonising aspect of the new 
regulations, as may be seen in the case study on investment trusts, below.  
 
The fourth key change 
introduced by FIEL 
(regarding disclosure in 
tender offers) was 
strongly influenced by the 
events surrounding the 
Livedoor debacle 
(examined below), and 
acted as one of several 
effective deterrents to 
hostile takeovers, which 
many foreign investors 
view as a failure in 
corporate governance 
and a wedge in the 
market for corporate 
control.   The optimal role 
of hostile takeovers in the 
market for corporate 
control remains hotly contested to this date (addressed in Appendix 2). This aspect of 
the FIEL, similarly to the “Guidelines for Defending Corporate Value” with regard to 
 
Figure 7: Financial and Insurance Services, % of total exports 
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Corporations Act reform, frustrated foreign investors who had eagerly anticipated the 
introduction of more Anglo Saxon style M&A practices.    
 
Much like the New Companies Law, the FIEL has been updated frequently since 




Figure 8: Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (USD mns) 
Source: JETRO, Europacifica 
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3. Evaluation of the Koizumi reforms and lessons learned 
Admittedly, Koizumi’s reforms do 
appear to have missed their mark 
by some metrics.  Targets for 
drastically increasing inward 
Foreign Direct Investment were 
set34, but only temporarily met.   
Similarly, success in promoting 
Japan as a “Financial Services 
Nation” was only partially 
successful.  On one hand within 
the services sector, financial 
services productivity is 
comparatively competitive.  Total 
factor productivity in the sector hit 
an early trough following the GFC, 
and by our above framework of 
economic analysis, was assisted 
by not only deregulation but also 
positive asset allocation, as may 
be observed in the rising rate of 
intangible investment as well as 
allocation to innovative capital as 
a percentage of capital.   
Anecdotally, we may also observe 
disposal of non-performing assets 
as supportive of financial sector 
productivity.  Still, as mentioned 
above, there were limits to the 
ability of financial sector recovery 
to relieve Japan of its economic 
malaise.  From a global competitiveness standpoint, financial services lagged far behind the 
export-oriented IT or manufacturing sectors.    
Comparing exports of financial services with those of other large global financial centres 
however yields a much more sombre verdict on the FSA’s goal of promoting Japan as a 
“Financial Services Nation” (see Figure 7: Financial and Insurance Services, % of total 
exports).  
The FIEL is not entirely to blame for this, however, nor does it invalidate other benefits of 
2006 reforms.  Incidentally, inward FDI did increase from 2006 onward (see Figure 8: 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (USD mns)),though failed to maintain its gains.  Peaking 
at a meager USD24.5bn per annum, inward FDI failed to recover following the GFC; outward 
FDI meanwhile regained its peak of USD120bn post-GFC. 
Conversely, a much more positive conclusion may be drawn when examining portfolio flows.  
In absolute terms, portfolio inflows dwarf foreign direct investment; as of calendar year 2013, 
net inward investment cleared JPY 20trn.    
                                                 
34 Koizumi announced targets to double FDI by 2008 in a 2003 speech (Wada 2005) 
 
Figure 9: Financial services vs Services sector productivity  
Source: Europacifica, RIETI  
Figure 10: Spending on Intangibles by Major Industry 
Source: (Fukao, Hisa and Miyagawa 2012) 
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Foreign investors have become 
the largest investor class in the 
Japanese equity market since the 
time most recently eclipsing 
traditionally cross-shareholding 
financial institutions (see Figure 
12: Japanese shareholdings, 
distribution by type of investor).  
This is a significant shift in the 
composition of share ownership 
that would not have happened 
without the Big Bang, and was 
further facilitated by reforms to the 
financial sector and changes to 
share transfer regulations under 
the New Companies Act. 
Many credit the Koizumi 
administration for having 
enhanced the allure of Japanese 
corporates after having overcome 
the “three excesses” of excess 
debt, excess employment and 
excess capacity that beset 
Japanese corporates, by virtue of 
the conditions surrounding the 
resolution of the Japanese 
banking crisis.35  Indeed, we may 
observe empirically that, during 
the Koizumi administration, 
chronic underutilization of 
manufacturing capacity resolved, 
as did corporate leverage.  
Although capacity under-utilisation temporarily resumed with the global financial crisis (GFC), 
it was quick to correct thereafter.  Problematically however, corporate deleveraging appeared 
too successful in that it failed to give way to new risk-taking behaviour once the cycle turned, 
yet another signal that resolving the Japanese banking crisis was not enough to boost final 
demand.  As a result, try as they might, foreign investment into Japanese stocks has been 
unable to propel Japanese stocks to new highs.   
Foreign investors find it tough to avoid Japan’s stock market altogether, given it is the world’s 
second largest by market capitalisation.   But their investments wax and wane with economic 
cycles and remain, on trend, barely sufficient to offset domestic reductions in risk-taking. 
                                                 
35 (Sakai, Japan’s Economy in the Post-Koizumi Era 2006) 
  
Figure 11: Japanese capacity utilisation vs corporate leverage 
Source: FRED, Europacifica 
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Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) on the other hand reflects the stunted market for 
corporate control.  As mentioned above, inward FDI remains subdued even despite the surge 
in foreign share ownership.  Responsible at least in part for lacklustre inward direct 
investment are (a) perceived 
limitations to access to the 
Japanese market for corporate 
control and (b) perceived 
limitations to the ability of 
shareholders to influence 
governance. 
The next logical step, it would 
appear, would be to bring 
governance up to global 
standards, enhancing the 
appeal of cleaned-up corporate 
Japan for good.  Under Koizumi, 
this did not happen, and one 
major root of the perceived 
failure of the reform programme.   
Despite this considerable drawback however, there remain aspects of the programme that 
still contributed to the advancement of financial sector and capital market function. 
 
A top-down LAISR Evaluation 
Employing APEC’s five-point LAISR framework36 to evaluate the Koizumi structural reform 
program, we observe that: 
i. Regulatory reform: The implementation of FIEL covered significant ground in both 
updating Japanese regulations and harmonising them with global (American) 
precedents.  Many new regulations were clearly modeled after Sarbanes-Oxley in the 
US. In some markets, regulation was effective in increasing market activity (e.g. the 
FX market and eventually the Investment Trust market).  However, much as with 
Sarbanes-Oxley, associated compliance costs remain significant, which remains an 
oft-expressed concern for other regional regulatory authorities under pressure to 
implement US-style reforms.  Japan continues to update regulations to adapt to 
changing market conditions.  Recent updates to regulations concerning Investment 
Trusts in particular might prove amenable to the adoption of the Asia Regional Funds 
Passport (see Appendix 3).  
ii. Competition policy: although FIEL, the New Corporations Act and postal reform all 
attempted to break down barriers to regional competition in financial services, the 
delay of postal privatisation and its partial nature led to muted improvement in 
financial sector competition.  Moreover, the perceived protection of cross-border 
acquisition targets decreased the market-opening effect of the New Corporations Act.  
As a result, growth in inward FDI has failed to sustain, even as outward FDI has 
rebounded. 
iii. Public sector management: The Koizumi reforms were bold in their consolidation of 
power under the Prime Minister’s office and cabinet (via the CEFP) but envisioned a 
reduced role for central government in the financial sector, once the banking crisis 
                                                 
36 (APEC Secretariat 2006) 
 
Figure 13: Nikkei 225  
Source: FRED, Europacifica 
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had passed.  The postal privatisation referendum was a major political coup.  
However, implementation of postal privatisation was much delayed. Separately, the 
dilution in practice of new laws governing cross-border investment became apparent 
in application. Some argue37 that the shortfalls in overall macroeconomic policy, 
including ineffective fiscal stimulus, has created new problems for policy, including a 
massive debt overhang. 
iv. Strengthening economic and legal infrastructure:  The combination of the New 
Companies Act and FIEL made substantial strides in updating Japanese legal and 
regulatory infrastructure, incorporating regulatory harmonisation and a legal 
framework for cross-border investment.  Nonetheless, the application of the legal 
framework remains intransparent for many foreign investors.  With regard to 
economic infrastructure, despite the availability of new financial products for 
Japanese households and the rise in popularity of vehicles such as Investment Trusts 
and Foreign Exchange, risk assets remain a very small part of the household balance 
sheet.  By this measure, Koizumi’s “from savings to investment” strategy has enjoyed 
only limited success (see Appendix 4).  
v. Corporate governance: one of the most contested points of Japanese structural 
reform to date, including those of the Koizumi era, is related to corporate governance.  
Underlying the debate are questions of the appropriateness and applicability of the 
model of shareholder primacy. The Corporations Act disappointed both domestic and 
foreign investor expectations for improved governance in 2006 (see TSE Saito’s 
comment, above).  As a result, growth in inward FDI has not persisted. Moreover, 
interest regarding corporate governance seemed to die down after Koizumi stepped 
down (Figure 37: Indicator of Corporate Governance awareness, Japan).  However, 
the Corporations Law has undergone further reform since enactment, from 2008 to 
2012.  Meanwhile, PM Abe’s work on Japan’s stewardship code as well as the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange’s corporate governance code since then have revived interest in 
corporate governance. The debate on governance is one we expect to escalate in the 
APEC region, particularly as reforms to China’s financial systems and state owned 
enterprises progress.    
 
 
Bottom-up evaluation: Case Studies 
The following individual case studies highlight key lessons learned from 2006 
reforms: 
1. The Japanese Investment Trust market was a clear beneficiary of the FIEL, 
expanding in size and range under new streamlined regulations. 
2. Two high-profile cases first built then dashed hopes for a new market for 
corporate control under the New Corporations Act.  Subsequent revisions to the 
Act and new Stewardship and Corporate Governance codes however give 
investors reason to hope for (albeit slow) change. 
3. The spectacular legislation of Postal Privatisation demonstrated the benefits of 
policy sequencing and its disappointing implementation, the pitfalls of policy 
gradualism.   Subsequent developments meanwhile show that reform is not 
completed with privatisation alone; additional regulatory and structural 
adjustments are often necessary accompaniments to large-scale government 
privatisations. 
  
                                                 
37  (Hoshi and Kashyap, Why Did Japan Stop Growing? 2011) 
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3.1. Lessons from the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law: case study of the 
Investment Trust market 
Although it would be overstating the benefits of FIEL to say it “completed” Japanese 
reforms in a general sense, there were some examples of “market completing” 
functionality.  Legislators had learned lessons from reactive and incomplete market-
opening reforms in the 1980’s, and sought to strengthen the legal, regulatory and 
macroprudential aspects of Japan’s securities law in keeping with developments 
overseas (specifically, 
Sarbanes-Oxley).   
 
Examination of the 
investment trust 
(toushin) market reveals 
both benefits and costs 
associated with FIEL.  
The introduction of new 
registration and 
disclosure requirements 
in the toushin market 
imposed clear 
compliance costs upon 
a growing industry 
(which was setting up 
for expansion alongside 
planned postal 
privatisation).  Upon 




as they fell subject to 
new reporting and 
disclosure regulations, 
where prior to FIEL they 
were exempt.   
 
It is unclear how much 
of the decline, in 
absolute terms, was due 
to tighter regulation and how much was due to risk-aversion associated with volatile 
risk assets alongside the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis.  However, we might 
adjust for the effects of the crisis on the household balance sheet by examining the 
ratio of toushin to stocks (thus comparing two classes of risk assets and adjusting for 
fluctuations in risk tolerance (see Figure 14). 
 
The ratio of toushin to equity investments shows a clear structural shift in late 2006, 
testifying to the success of reforms within this industry sector. 
 
This was due to the streamlining effects of the FIEL upon registration and disclosure 
of new products. Introduction of cross-sectional consolidated regulation was broad in 
scope, covering not only investment trust beneficiary rights and mortgage securities 
but also collective investment schemes.  Not only did this framework of application 
 
Figure 14: The ratio of investment trusts to equities on the Japanese 
household balance sheet  
Source: BOJ, Europacifica 
 
Figure 15: Publicly Offered Investment Trusts 
Source: Japan Investment Trust Association 
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do away with the necessity for redundant regulatory adjustments product-by-product, 
but allowed for some flexibility, extending the scope of application of existing 
regulation to new products sharing similar aspects to products already covered at 
inception of FIEL.   
 
It is possible that the immediacy with which the Financial Services Agency went to 
work on updates to the newly implemented regulations (its “Plan for Strengthening 
the Competitiveness of Japan’s Financial and Capital Markets” was made public in 
December 2007, and was approved in the Diet in 2008) also created a springboard 
for further growth in Investment Trusts 
 
After an initial setback in expansion of the Investment Trust market in 2008 (due 
largely to effects of the Global Financial Crisis), the toushin market resumed 
expansion to new highs in net asset value (see Figure 15: Publicly Offered 
Investment Trusts). The result suggests that the benefits of well-designed regulatory 
reform, even in the presence of compliance costs, may be realised over the long 
term. 
 
With regards to impact to Global Value Chains, the benefits provided by streamlined 
approval of new investment trust products under FIEL may facilitate and enhance 
participation in region-wide initiatives such as Asia Regional Funds Passport. 
 
3.2. Lessons from the New Companies Act: case studies in corporate governance 
In the words of Columbia Professor Curtis Milhaupt, Japan has chosen “enabling” over 
“mandatory” reforms to corporate governance. This is a significant difference between US 
and Japanese corporate governance systems, and one that international investors find 
hard to appreciate. 
One “enabling” facet of Japanese law is that it is left intentionally vauge, as to allow 
flexibility of interpretation. Less charitably, vagaries may have paved the way for 
discretion by bureacrats, who have incentives to preserve their policymaking power.  
Protection of Japan’s traditional model of stakeholder capitalism (rather than Anglo-Saxon 
shareholder primacy) was “enabled” in the process of legislation of the commercial code 
reforms, and its arena following 2006 reforms was the market for corporate control.   
Hostile takeovers, which were alien M&A practices to Japan until the mid-2000’s38.     The 
scene was set in the early 2000’s, when, prior to the legislation of the New Companies 
Act, banks began to unwind cross shareholdings (with the help of the Bank of Japan), as 
to reduce systemic risk.  The sale of cross-held shares eroded one pillar of the “stable 
shareholding” system prevalent from the time of the zaibatsu system, exposing firms to 
the rising prospect of unfriendly takeovers.   
                                                 
38 As mentioned in section 2.1, the threat of forced mergers was traditionally used as an 
incentive for lagging firms to boost performance and thus takeovers historically carried a 
social stigma 
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In early 2005, the high-profile domestic takeover attempt of Nippon Broadcasting System 
(NBS), a subsidiary of Fuji TV by upstart internet firm Livedoor (targeting the 22.5% stake 
NBS held in Fuji) suddenly brought the corporate governance debate to the fore (see 
Figure 16: Key Events surrounding the Livedoor-Fuji TV takeover battle for NBS (2005)).  
The Tokyo High Court ruling that the Fuji TV takeover defense strategy was “grossly 
unfair” was a landmark precedent which in turn could have marked the beginning of a 
market for corporate control in Japan.  Things looked promising for activist investors 
when only days after the first Tokyo District Court ruling in the Livedoor-Nippon 
Broadcasting case in March 2005 (in favour of Livedoor), the Tokyo Courts also struck 
down a poison pill strategy adopted by Nireco, a maker of hi-tech measuring devices. 
Figure 16: Key Events surrounding the Livedoor-Fuji TV takeover battle for NBS (2005) 
 
Jan. 17 -- Fuji TV announces a public tender offer to acquire a more than 50 percent stake in Nippon 
Broadcasting.  
 
Feb. 8 -- Livedoor boosts its stake in Nippon Broadcasting to 35 percent in terms of outstanding shares by 
acquiring a 29.6 percent portion through the Tokyo Stock Exchange's off-hours trading system.  
 
Feb. 9 - Fuji TV rejects Livedoor's proposal for business cooperation, saying it will counter the Internet service 
provider's acquisition of a major stake in Nippon Broadcasting.  
 
Feb. 10 - Fuji TV cuts its equity stake acquisition goal in its public tender offer for Nippon Broadcasting to 25 
percent in a bid to secure its success.  
 
Feb. 23 - Nippon Broadcasting announces a plan to issue Fuji TV warrants for 47.2 million new shares to ward 
off Livedoor's takeover bid.  
 
Feb. 24 - Livedoor takes legal action, asking the Tokyo District Court to bar the radio network from issuing 
share warrants to Fuji TV. Fuji TV extends the deadline of its tender offer for Nippon Broadcasting to March 7.  
 
March 8 - Fuji TV says it has secured 36.47 percent of all outstanding shares in Nippon Broadcasting through its 
successful public tender offer through March 7.  
 
March 11 - The Tokyo District Court issues a preliminary injunction to bar Nippon Broadcasting from issuing 
Fuji TV share warrants. Nippon Broadcasting immediately files an objection to the ruling with the same court.  
 
March 15 - Fuji TV decides on a sharp dividend increase to 5,000 yen per share for the fiscal year to March 31 to 
raise the price of its stock and make it less affordable for a company pursuing a takeover.  
 
March 16 - The Tokyo District Court dismisses Nippon Broadcasting's objection over the court's decision. 
Nippon Broadcasting immediately appeals to the Tokyo High Court. Livedoor's stake in Nippon Broadcasting 
exceeds 50 percent in terms of voting rights.  
 
March 22 - Fuji TV says it has filed registration with the government for the issuance of up to 50 billion yen in 
new shares to existing shareholders.  
 
March 23 - The Tokyo High Court upholds the lower court ruling banning Nippon Broadcasting from issuing 
warrants for new shares to Fuji TV. Nippon Broadcasting gives up on the ''poison pill'' plan.  
 
March 24 - Softbank Investment Corp. becomes Fuji TV's largest shareholder by borrowing a 13.88 percent stake 
held by Nippon Broadcasting.  
 
March 31 - Nippon Broadcasting fixes the record of shareholders.  
 
April 18 - Fuji TV and Livedoor amicably settle their battle for control of Nippon Broadcasting.  
 
Late June - Nippon Broadcasting will hold a regular general shareholders meeting. 
Source: Kyodo News 
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But Nireco turned out to be an outlier; in the two years subsequent to the Livedoor/NBS 
case, over 400 firms officially adopted takeover defence stategies.  In hindsight, the alarm 
regarding hostile takeovers was excessive.  There were only 23 reported hostile takeover 
attempts between 2000 and 2013, according to Dealogic, of which only seven were 
successful.39  
This may have been because the incipient market for corporate control was met by a 
disproportionately vehement reprisal by a combination of bureaucratic intervention and 
idiosyncratic interpretation of the law.  Widespread fear of hostile takeovers triggered by 
the Livedoor case prompted bureaucrats (METI and MOJ) to compile Japan’s “Takeover 
Defense Guidelines” in May 2005.  This was a logical response to prospects of a rise in 
hostile takeovers but the fervor with which firms adopted takeover defences was 
disproportionate to the number and scale of actual attempts.  
The outcome of subsequent contests for corporate control, this time involving foreign 
stakes, sent a discouraging message to foreign investors, who may have reached the 
conclusion that reform had once again been hijacked by bureaucrats and non-market 
actors with vested interests. 
One such high-profile case was Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), L.P. v. 
BullDog Sauce Co (see Figure 17).  Steel Partners, an activist US hedge fund, set out to 
acquire a controlling stake in BullDog Sauce, a manufacturer of condiments and sauces 
which also had a real estate division.  BullDog Sauce adopted takeover defences, diluting 
Steel Partners’ interest, which Steel Partners tried legally to contest, and was ultimately 
unsuccessful.   
One of the key determinants of the case was the approval of defence measures by 
resolution at a general shareholders’ meeting.  In itself, a court of law upholding 
shareholders’ decisions is not unusual.  Yet many foreign investors perceived the 
response to Steel Partners’ appeal to the Tokyo High Court’s ruling in favour of BullDog 
sauce as pointedly aimed against their interests and against those of “free fair and global” 
markets.    
 
A second (more nuanced) reason for foreign investors’ dismay over the outcome may 
have been that the validity of the shareholder resolution - the most consistently upheld 
argument in defence of BullDog Sauce came not from law or precedent, but from the 
bureaucracy’s interpretation of the New Companies Act - from METI and MoJ Guidelines.   
 
                                                 
39 As cited in the Wall Street Journal: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324216004578482943175923954 
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3.3. Lessons learned from postal privatisation: case study in policy sequencing 
 
Although perceived as the boldest of Koizumi’s reform measures and one that could have 
reshaped the financial sector entirely40, postal privatisation has, in implementation, fallen 
far short of its original ambitious goal.  Lessons learned might be divided into three parts 
– firstly the elements of its successful legislation, secondly the characteristics of its much 
delayed41 and scaled-back implementation and thirdly, the necessity for ongoing reform 
following privatisation. 
                                                 
40 (Fink 2010) 
41 The original target date for full privatisation was 2010; currently, the target date for partial 
privatisation (full float of Yucho and Kampo is 2017). 
Figure 17: Key Events in the “BullDog Sauce” case 
May 2007: US activist hedge fund Steel Partners’ Japan Strategic Fund owns 10.25% equity stake in BullDog 
Sauce, a manufacturer of sauces and condiments with a real estate division. 
18 May 2007: Steel Partners makes tender offer for BullDogSauce, of JPY1584 per share.  BullDog’s board 
responds by questioning how the company would be run were the bid successful. 
7 June 2007: BullDog Sauce rejects the bid, claiming that it is not in the shareholders’ interests, at the same time 
announcing plans for to propose a special resolution before the general shareholders’ meeting on 24 June to 
authorise the company to issue warrants to the company’s shareholders.   
Conditions of the warrants:  
- All other shareholders who owned shares on 10 July would receive three warrants for every share 
owned. - Warrants could be exercised in September for the price of JPY1.  - The company would exercise unused warrants for three shares.   - If exercised, Steel Partners would be left with only 2.82% of outstanding shares; thereupon BullDog 
Sauce would purchase Steel Partners’ warrants for JPY396 each, allowing Steel Partners to purchase 
sufficient shares to take holdings back to their pre-warrant percentage. - If the offer were abandoned before 5 July, BullDog sauce would not issue warrants. 
 
13 June 2007: Steel Partners seeks an injunction from Tokyo District Court to prevent new share issuance on 
the basis of (a) shareholder inequality (article 109 of the Corporation Law) and (b) unfair issuance (article 247 of 
the Corporation Law)* 
24 June 2007:  83% of BullDog Sauce shareholders on record vote to adopt the resolution.**   
28 June 2007: Tokyo District Court rules in favour of BullDog Sauce, on the grounds that shareholders have 
equal rights to new issues and that the decision was approved by the majority of shareholders, per METI/MOJ 
guidelines.  Steel Partners appeals the decision to the Tokyo High Court. 
9 July 2007: Tokyo High Court affirms the ruling in favour of BullDog Sauce, ruling that (i) Steel Partners is an 
abusive acquirer; (ii) the offer was not made in good faith; and (iii) the offer was detrimental to the value of 
BullDog sauce and its shareholder (justifying unequal treatment of Steel Partners as shareholders); Steel 
Partners appeals the decision to the Supreme Court. 
7 August 2007: Supreme Court rejects Steel Partners’ appeal opening the way for new share issuance, declining 
however to endorse the ruling of the Tokyo High Court that Steel Partners is an abusive acquirer, instead 
upholding the validity of a shareholder resolution, in line with METI/MOJ guidelines. 
* Steel Partners sought precedence in the Livedoor ruling, where Fuji TV’s plan to issue warrants was deemed 
“grossly unfair”. 
** Two aspects of this meeting to note; the meeting was held on a Sunday (to ensure maximum turnout)  and Source: (Padgett 2011), (Lessambo 2016), (Linklaters 2007) 
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As highlighted above, the Koizumi administration’s institutional framework –specifically 
the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) - was pivotal both to resolving Japan’s 
banking crisis and to the success of legislating the subsequent structural reforms of 2006.  
The sequence of these reforms was of paramount importance. 
Indeed, one of the most valuable lessons learned by Koizumi and his team of reformists 
while in office was that of  “reflation before reform”, in policy sequencing42. Koizumi’s 
reform experience taught us that in Japan’s case (an aging, stagnant developed economy 
plagued by deflation and ever-expanding public sector debt), reflation creates more 
palatable conditions for introducing structural reform.   
At a visceral level, even moderate wage growth and asset reflation made all the 
difference in the world when asking the public to accept an unpalatable reform (with 
implicit job losses and removal of a popular risk haven).  Given the significant number of 
jobs as well as influential regional votes influenced by the Postal lobby, it is argued that, 
absent reflation and concomitant prospects for employment growth, there would have 
been no postal reform referendum 
and thus no reform legislation.  
Conversely, reflation turned the 
postal referendum from an issue 
of great public concern into a 
contest among bureaucrats and 
politicians.   
The benefits of reflation in 
lubricating policy reforms are 
manifold. Reflation allowed 
assisted in another policy 
objective, of fiscal reform.  As may 
be seen in Figure 18: Reflation 
helped Japan surpass fiscal 
targets, as a greater proportion of 
corporate Japan became profitable (and went from paying 0% to 40% tax), fiscal 
revenues exceeded targets, curtailing the government’s primary balance deficits at a 
faster pace than expected. 
 
The benefits of reflation were eminently applicable to postal privatisation.  Japan Postal 
Savings was a necessary partner in Koizumi’s reform of the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Program (FILP), one major avenue of cutting down on public expenditure.  Prior to FILP 
reform, postal savings as well as pension reserves were obligatorily made available to the 
FILP, a major government programme for social welfare and infrastructure finance.  FILP 
reform established independence in management of both pension reserves and Postal 
deposits, upon which Government Pension Investment Fund as well as Japan Post 
holdings of FILP paper was wound down43. 
 
Although much delayed from its initial target date of 2010, the JPY1.4 trillion float of the 
postal savings and insurance arms of Japan Post Holdings in November 2015 showed, a 
public offering more easily absorbed in an environment of rising stock prices (thus 
increasing direct revenue associated with the stock float). There are further benefits yet to 
accrue from postal privatisation; as demonstrated above, revenues to the government 
                                                 
42 Emergency Countermeasures to Deflation (Japan Cabinet Office 2002) 
43 see http://www.mof.go.jp/english/filp/filp_report/zaito2011/zaito2011-4-05.html 
 
Figure 18: Reflation helped Japan surpass fiscal targets 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan 
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from a privately operating firm also tend to improve during times of economic expansion 
and reallocation of debt-heavy portfolios toward stocks might also assist in both reflation 
and fiscal reconstruction.44   
 
That reflation is a necessary condition for fiscal as well as structural reform is a pivotal 
assumption to test for sequencing of PM Abe’s “three arrows” of reform today.  
 
Unfortunately, the benefits of policy sequencing only enjoyed a limited window of 
success.  The same year as the Postal referendum, Koizumi’s term as leader of the LDP 
expired, upon which he was required to step down as Prime Minister.  The reforms 
spearheaded by Koizumi were dependent on succession, which alongside the advent of 
the Global Financial Crisis proved damaging for the implementation of postal 
privatisation. 
 
After several years of rapid 
leadership turnover within the 
LDP and deteriorating 
sentiment accompanying the 
Global Financial Crisis, a 
frustrated Japanese electorate 
handed the reins to the 
opposition party.  The CEFP as 
we knew it was subsequently 
dismantled by the Democratic 
Party of Japan in 200945, which 
may have undermined 
credibility in the party’s 
leadership credentials, giving 
rise to difficulties in legislating 






Though reinstated by Prime 
Minister Abe upon the LDP’s 
return to power in 2013, the 
CEFP’s policymaking power 
was no longer as centralised as 
under the Koizumi 
administration, with many of the 
central policy reforms siphoned 
off to a “growth strategy” rather 
                                                 
44  (Fink, The Business Case for Reforming Japan Post 2010) 
45 Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party lost a 2009 election to the DPJ, led by PM Yukio 
Hatoyama.  The Hatoyama administration rebranded the CEFP as the “National Strategy 
Office” and divested it of one of its key policy functions, the compilation of Honebuto no 
Houshin or “Big Boned Policy”.  The Honebuto no Houshin were reinstated in 2013 (with the 
 
Figure 19: Composition of assets, Japan Postal Insurance (Kampo)  
Source: Japan Post
 
Figure 20: Composition of assets, Japan Postal Insurance (Kampo)  
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than on a central structural policy platform.46   
 
Again however, reflation came to the rescue – a rebound in asset markets and growth 
since the start of the Abe administration provided favourable conditions to renew the 
privatisation process, and as such Japan Post Bank and Insurance arms of Japan Post 
Holdings were listed and partially privatised in 2015. 
 
The partial float of November 2015 (in which retail investors were heavy participants, 
divesting themselves of cash) represented progress in structural reform.  Both Yucho 
(postal savings) and Kampo (postal insurance) are diversifying their investment portfolios 
away from Japanese Government Bonds, increasing their allocations in foreign assets. 
Japan Post Bank increased its allocation to foreign bonds from 15.9% as at the end of 
fiscal 2014 to 22.1% (JPY45.39trn) as of April 2016; Kampo meanwhile raised its foreign 
bond allocation from 2.5% to 4.9% of its JPY81.5trn portfolio over the same period.47 
 
Bringing the case study analysis to its last point, despite progress in the privatisation of 
Japan Post, the flow-on benefits of privatisation to Global Value Chains still appear 
limited.  At time of writing, Japan Post remains a largely government-controlled 
juggernaut in the financial and insurance sectors. Yucho (postal savings) and Kampo 
(postal insurance) balance sheets remain inflated by cash that flowed in from households 
when the Japanese banking crisis was in full swing and sentiment was at its worst.  
Because of Japan Post’s long history as a government-owned institution and also 
because of the government’s ongoing interests in the holding company, many private 
sector competitors in financial services and insurance remain skeptical of the benefits of 
privatisation.  Competitors are apprehensive that in the absence of regulatory 
harmonisation, privatisation might merely transform an explicit government guarantee to 
the largest, government-protected players in financial services and insurance to an 
implicit one.  An implicitly protected Japan Post, if awarded a more extensive mandate 
than before, might dampen rather than promote competition in the financial sector.  Some 
of the same concerns voiced by foreign competitors in the late 2000’s have been 
repeated again under the Abe administration.48. 
Complete privatisation (release of government control) alongside harmonisation of 
regulation for all institutions (including Japan Post) in these sectors would approximate 
the creation of a “level playing field” for both domestic and international players in the 
financial and insurance sectors, which is likely to have a positive impact to global value 
chains. 
3.4. Contributions to Regional and Global Value Chains 
Compared to the principal role Japan played in economic diplomacy following the Asian 
crisis as well as the resulting regional financial infrastructure49, Koizumi’s regional legacy 
is mostly indirect; free market values were internalised in Koizumi’s reforms rather than 
                                                 
CEFP reverting to its original nomenclature) upon the LDP’s subsequent return to power 
under current PM Abe. 
46 (H. Takenaka, 久々の「骨太方針」をどう読むか?" [How to evaluate the revived Honebuto-
no hōshin?] 2014) 
47 Japan Post website, 2016 
48 American Chamber of Commerce in Japan 2016) 
49 The Chiang Mai Initiative, or network of bilateral Central Bank swap agreements was built 
upon facilities originally established by the New Miyazawa Initiative in 1998, agreed in 
ASEAN + 3 discussions. 
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aggressively pursued; the use of “gaiatsu” (external pressure) as a policy tool may have 
been under-utilised.  This perhaps explains stunted growth in competitiveness of 
Japanese financial sector exports (see Figure 7: Financial and Insurance Services, % of 
total exports). 
Under the current Abe regime however, pursuit of TPP and other multilateral trade 
accords may assist in promoting internal structural reforms.50   
Within the region, the indirect benefits of structural reform are well recognised as 
substantial.  In its Asia Pacific Regional Economic Outlook in April 2015, the IMF remarked 
that, “Structural reforms remain critical to boost productivity growth across the region, 
including… initiatives to raise 
services productivity and labor 
force participation in Japan.”  
Recalling that services comprise 
over 70% of Japanese output, 
understanding the drivers of 
Japanese services sector 
underperformance is a vital 
input to successful structural 
reform. 
Until recently, Japan was the 
world’s second-largest 
economy, of which consumption 
still remains the largest share of 
GDP (above 60%); of this, 
imported goods and services 
comprise a significant share.  
Japan’s successes or failures in stoking domestic recovery cannot help but exercise an 
impact upon both regional and global supply chains and production.  
 
Figure 22: Net liquidation of Japanese securities by Asian investors 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Japan Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
 
The impact of Koizumi’s financial services reforms upon the Japanese economy was 
mostly positive.   As demonstrated above, the resolution of Japan’s banking crisis 
removed one barrier to growth of the world’s second (now third) -largest economy. 
                                                 
50 (Urata 2016); also see, from Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation): 
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2000/033/proposal.html  
 
Figure 21: Surge in Japanese cross border bank claims, Asia Region 
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Domestic bank lending recovered; cross-border claims also recovered as Japanese banks 
renewed overseas lending.  Cross-border loans to Asian borrowers grew at a more 
subdued pace than to North American and European borrowers, until the time of the 
Global Financial Crisis, whereupon they rebounded (see Figure 21: Surge in Japanese 
cross border bank claims, Asia Region).   
 
Outward portfolio 
investment grew as 
investment trusts 
flourished and large 
public pools of funds 
(such as Postal 
Savings, Postal 
Insurance and the 
Government Pension 
Investment Fund) 
diversified away from 
domestic bonds, into 
foreign assets. Inward 
direct investment only 
temporarily recovered 
moreover remained 
muted compared to 
outward direct 
investment by Japanese 
firms.  Interestingly 
however, the Asia 
Pacific region was a 
smaller but steadier 
source of FDI inflows 
into Japan since 2006. 
To highlight specific 
contributions of the 
2006 reforms to regional 
market development, we 
point firstly to the ongoing growth in the Japanese Investment Trust market since the 
introduction of FIEL.  It is interesting to note the disproportionately high share of 
Australian and NZ dollar assets among investment trusts’ foreign currency-denominated 
offerings (see Figure 24), thanks to higher yields associated with these currencies among 
developed country assets. 
Going forward, the ability to extend the scope of existing regulation to new products 
sharing similar aspects to products already covered at inception of FIEL should prove 
beneficial for regional initiatives such as Asia Regional Funds Passport, which aspires to 
establish region-wide fund portability.  
There was, on the positive side, a surge in awareness of matters concerning corporate 
governance alongside the implementation of the New Corporations Act.  Some regional 
trade partners welcomed the reforms.  APEC credited the code with success in promoting 
business growth (pointing to a 10% increase in the number of business start-ups since 
the abolition of minimum capital requirements) even as it “strengthened certain corporate 
disclosure requirements”.  Other large market participants were less generous in their 
 
Figure 23: Asian Investors show smaller but steady interest in 
Japanese FDI 
 
Figure 24: Strong interest in Oceanic currency-denominated 
investment trusts 
Source: JETRO, ITA 
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evaluations.  In 2007, TSE President Atsushi Saito aired his exasperation with the state of 
Japanese corporate governance at a UBS conference, pointing to the role of poor 
disclosure and oversight in dimming the attractiveness of Japanese shares to foreign 
investors. 
Eventual recognition of those inadequacies however gave rise to further regulatory 
amendments.  Boding well for greater representation of minority shareholders, if not full 
convergence toward a model of shareholder primacy, Japan’s government pension 
investment fund (GPIF) has shown incipient signals of activism. Japan’s stewardship 
code was drafted in 2014, which included both a more activist remit for the GPIF as well 
as endorsement of the Nikkei 400 Index51, which lists firms meeting specific governance 
criteria.52  The Stewardship Code builds upon reforms enacted during the Koizumi era.   
There remains much work to be done, however.  Although GPIF is a signatory to the 
code, it has yet to incorporate the code into its own investment principles.  Corporate 
governance “best practices” remains a work in progress in Japan, and is a matter of 
region-wide interest, as global financial systems become ever more interrelated.  APEC 
highlights the importance for corporations within the region to “hold the resources of their 
investors in good stewardship” and to “act in the interests of shareholders by 
transparently ensuring that investments create the highest possible rate of return” (APEC 
Secretariat 2006).   
 
3.5.  Applicability of lessons 
learned for the APEC region 
In order to evaluate the impact of 
Koizumi’s reforms on the region, it is 
useful to recall APEC’s definition of 
structural reform (see Section 2), and 
also added clarification from APEC’s 
2006 policy report that “the spotlight 
has naturally shifted to the structural 
and regulatory obstacles that inhibit 
cross-border trade by creating behind-
the-border barriers to doing better 
business”.  Keeping this theme in 
mind the following are areas in which 
APEC economies may benefit from 
Japan’s experience in overcoming – 
or at least attempting to overcome – such barriers: 
• The complementarity of capital reforms to reforms in financial services: China is 
learning the pitfalls of partial reforms in implementation, yet necessity to move 
forward in the process of capital account deregulation given ballooning shadow 
banking, “hot money” flows. 
 
• Policy sequencing: economic expansion makes structural reform more palatable.  
This may be another policy lesson useful for China in its market-opening reforms 
(noting delay in capital market reforms following bouts of market volatility). 
                                                 
51 see: http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/markets/indices/jpx-nikkei400/ 
52  (Japan Financial Services Agency 2014) 
 
Figure 25: Contribution of Financial Variables to IMF 
Financial Conditions Indices 
Source: (Osorio, Pongsaparn, & Unsal, 2011) 
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• Policy sequencing must account for “news shocks” to capital markets.  Other 
countries vulnerable to capital market shocks (Malaysia, Thailand, Korea – see 
Figure 27). 
 
• Compliance costs associated with harmonisation to global regulatory standards in 
financial systems where banks operate a traditional model of lending and deposit 
taking.  This is relevant in discussions pertaining to Basel IV reforms.  Many Asian 
economies see compliance costs as weighty against the perceived benefits of these 
reforms. 
 
• Idiosyncratic application of the rule of law may diminish the comparative appeal of 
investment into a regional economy.  Rule of law is one of the items many investors 
look for in all Asian economies (Ease of Doing Business Index) 
 
• “Mandatory” corporate governance regimes might be more transparent than 
“enabling” regimes in the eyes of foreign investors; e.g. Korea is moving toward more 
“mandatory” governance– Milhaupt & Gilson (2004) 
 
• Given the greater role of non-shareholding stakeholders in many Asian models of 
governance, there may be merit in collectively exploring alternative models to Anglo-
saxon governance models. Good corporate governance may not rely on shareholder 
primacy alone (e.g. cross-shareholdings in Korea (Kim and Sung 2009)), but does 
require standards of “best practices”.  
 
• Strong and centralised political leadership may be a pre-requisite to achieve success 
when battling vested interests to enact reform (this depends however on appointment 
of a reformist leader, in any nation) 
 
• Gradualist financial reform agendas run the risk of falling behind global trends and 
failing to achieve desired reform.  This concept may be applied to other countries with 
tightly regulated industries or capital controls (e.g. China, India) who are gauging 
speed and sequencing of deregulation. 
 
 
4. Next steps in the economy reform process 
Areas of the reform process where further developments are expected are: 
i. Continuing sell-off of cross-held shares and reform of corporate boards, 
alongside the restructuring of main bank relationships.  These measures 
remain pivotal to productivity improvements in the financial sector.53 
ii. Ongoing efforts to diversify the Japanese household balance sheet “from 
savings to investment”. 
iii. Ongoing adaptation of FIEL (Financial Instruments and Exchange Law) 
and Corporations Law to reflect new products and technological 
development, as well as in favour of further market opening measures. 
iv. Use of multilateral agreements and regional initiatives as levers to speed 
domestic reforms (e.g. the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia Regional 
Funds Passport) 
                                                 
53 The hostile takeover debate is related, but not interchangeable with the argument of 
reduction in cross-shareholdings.  Although the latter presents systemic risks, as seen during 
Japan’s financial crisis and their decline may create greater opportunities for hostile 
takeovers, there is evidence against the argument that absence of hostile takeovers owes 
primarily to cross-shareholdings.  (Kim and Sung 2009)  
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v. Target creation of a “level playing field” for competitors in the financial 
and insurance sectors in Japan’s ongoing postal privatisation. 
vi. Ongoing promotion of corporate governance including enhancements to 
Japan’s Stewardship Code, transition from passive to more active 
investment by GPIF and new products focused upon governance. 
 
Since the advent of financial globalisation, there is evidence that foreign pressure 
(gaiatsu; see section 2.1) has been, in some cases, successful in motivating domestic 
reform. Trade partners’ lobbying for reduction of trade barriers in agriculture in the 
negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has given rise to hopes for domestic 
agricultural reform. Regional accords may similarly become catalysts for reform in the 
Japanese financial sector. One such example is Japan’s signing on to the Asia Regional 
Funds Passport (ARFP). The need to adapt domestic practices for regional cooperation 
might yet motivate further domestic reform, and produce greater efficiencies in the sector.  
The benefits that the investment trust market has reaped from market-opening reforms so 
far make it a promising platform for market-leading reform in the financial sector.  
There are likely to be benefits to be achieved from full privatisation and reduction of 
Japan Post’s power in the financial and insurance sectors (providing a “level playing field” 
is established for all market participants).  There is empirical evidence that reducing the 
power of oligopolies in sectors of high market concentration (such as the financial sector) 
and boosting services sector productivity not only boosts GDP but an expansion in the 
elasticity of GDP to services sector productivity.54  
 
5. Policy Recommendations: 
In addition to advancing policies enumerated in section 2.5 (next steps), we recommend 
the following: 
a. Design deregulation incentives in the non-IT services sector not only to 
boost innovative capital but also to reallocate capital away from non-
innovative “dead weight” capital, which dulls productivity.  Strengthening 
corporate governance is vital to such incentives, given high likelihood 
that improvements to corporate governance will lead to improved asset 
allocation. 
b. Collect and publish further empirical data on characteristics of “good 
corporate governance” at firm and industry level; development of 
trackable metrics would prove an important complement to existing 
empirical analysis on asset allocation and productivity.   
c. That the GPIF adopt a more formal Statement of policy for corporate 
governance to supplement its existing Investment Principles55: 
d. Introduce clearer metrics when in regard to market-opening reforms 
going forward, with the aim of increasing the ease of doing business in 
Japan.  One option is that proposed by Haidar and Hoshi in 2015.56 
e. In order to more thoroughly quantify the impact of reforms on the entire 
Japanese economy independently of cyclical and idiosyncratic non-policy 
factors simulation-based modeling techniques such as CGE (Computable 
General Equilibrium) may be appropriate. Compilation of a CGE model 
                                                 
54 (Tyers and Asano 2015) 
55 see http://www.gpif.go.jp/en/about/pdf/investment_principles.pdf 
56 (Haidar and Hoshi 2015) 
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inclusive of both benefits and compliance costs might better account for 
the instantaneous impact of reforms upon the Japanese economy. 
f. The accuracy of cost-benefit calculations of reforms within the financial 
sector will be a vital input to CGE calibration.  A comprehensive ex-post 
facto cost-benefit review of FIEL and the New Corporations Law, 
inclusive of compliance costs, for example might hone the accuracy of 
the model. 
g. A Dynamic General Equilibrium framework could be developed when in 
regard to policy sequencing accounting also for the sensitivity of 
Japanese productivity to “news shocks”. 
h. Consider once again consolidating the CEFP’s structural reform 
policymaking platform under the Honebuto no Houshin (Big-boned policy) 
framework, which was instrumental to PM Koizumi’s policymaking 
successes.  
  
- 36 - 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – Empirical studies on productivity 
APEC cites the benefits of market-opening structural adjustments in allowing an economy to 
“better capitalize on technological growth” (APEC Secretariat, 2006).  It is possible to 
examine, empirically, the ability of Japan to capitalise on t echnology by examining 
developments in Japanese Total Factor Productivity.   
Hayashi and Prescott demonstrated in their groundbreaking analysis in 2002 the applicability 
of the Neoclassical Model of Growth in explaining the source of Japan’s “lost decade” of 
growth.  In it, a slump in exogenous total factor productivity (TFP) was the shock that dragged 
Japan’s potential growth (it’s “balanced growth path”) lower.  
Decomposing growth accounting using the same methodology as Hayashi and Prescott, Fink 
(2015) singles out the services sector (inclusive of financial services) as a candidate for 
structural reform.  Further studies decomposing productivity are reviewed below, focusing 
specifically on (a) the relationship between regulation and total factor productivity and (b) the 
ability of disparate sectors to capitalise on technological growth.    
The argument finds basis in three stylised facts on total factor productivity, as well as their 
implications.   
 
Fact 1. Total factor productivity is the #1 contributor to growth: In comparison with other 
OECD countries, TFP (or multifactor productivity, to use OECD conventions) is a significant 
 
Figure 26: Growth Accounting in the OECD         
  Source: OECD 
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contributor to overall output growth, offsetting the negative contribution of labor input growth 
between 1985 and 2009: 
As might be seen from the 
below graphic (a growth 
accounting exercise from 
(Fink, 2015)), output per 
capita correlates strongly with 
total factor productivity (the 
Solow Residual, or Aα/(1-α) in 
the graphic): 
 
Fact 2. There is a significant 
divide (heterogeneity) in 
productivity between 
sectors 
Japan experienced a high rate 
of TFP growth until 1990, upon which there 
was a period of significant stagnation. Hayashi 
and Prescott put forward in 2002 (using the 
neoclassical model of growth) that Japan’s 
“lost decade” owed mostly to slumping total 
factor productivity.  Although the tech boom of 
the late 1990’s brought renewed growth, 
there was a significant split between 
productivity in the manufacturing and 
services sector, and in the IT versus non-
IT sectors: 
It is clear that productivity in the services 
sector lagged behind manufacturing; even 
starker is the divide between IT-related 
businesses and non-IT related businesses 





Fact 3. IT sector deflators posted negative growth from 2000 onward 
 
Figure 28: TFP (indexed at 1973=1) 




Figure 27: Japanese growth accounting, 1970-2008 
Source: (Fink, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 29: Deflation in the IT sector 
Source: (Fink, 2015) 
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Fink (2015)57 examines the sources of the divide in total factor productivity growth, putting 
forward the hypothesis that relative deflation in the IT sector (see Figure 5) represented 
technological advancements represents a positive contribution to productivity, in the form of 
Investment-specific technology.   
 
The explanation: Investment-specific technology (IST) growth  
Fink (2005) finds a much-improved fit when simulating Japanese growth accounting using the 
neoclassical model of growth with Investment-Specific Technology, versus base-case 
(Hayashi-Prescott) model58. Simulations use the Conesa Kehoe and Ruhl model (Conesa, 
Kehoe, & Ruhl, 2007).  Fink (2005) estimates that IST explains roughly one-third of total 
factor productivity growth since the 1970’s.  
 
Implication: Productivity is heterogeneous, and IST a differentiator 
The implication of the large role of IST in overall TFP growth is that sectors closer to the 
technology frontier – manufacturing and IT - are likeliest to benefit from the gains in IST – and 
services, particularly non-IT services are likeliest to suffer.  The opposing forces of cost-
saving technological gains in IT sector output combined with a slump in economic activity 
accompanying Japan’s financial crisis gave rise to a two-speed economy in Japan that 
persists to this day.59   
Focusing on the contribution of 
Information Communications 
Technology (ICT) to Japanese 
output growth, Fukao, 
Miyagawa, Pyo and Rhee60 find 
a suitable comparison in fellow 
“input-led growth” economy, 
South Korea.  Both Japan and 
Korea were characterized by 
high productivity growth in IT 
sectors and low growth in non-IT 
sectors from the late 1990’s 
onward; both economies are 
also characterized by 
significantly lower productivity in 
their services sectors than their manufacturing sectors, even though Korean productivity 
rebounded shortly after the Asian crisis.   
 
                                                 
57 (Fink, Heterogeneity in Japanese TFP, Part 1: Why Overcoming Deflation Alone is Not 
Enough 2015) 
58 (Hayashi and Prescott 2002) 
59 (Fink, Heterogeneity in Japanese TFP, Part 2: Regulation, Capital Allocation, and TFP in 
Japan, 2016) 
60 (Fukao, et al. 2012) 
 
Figure 30: Japanese TFP growth, Adjusted 
 Source: JIP Database, Europacifica 
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Poor growth in capital services, particularly non-IT capital services 
In their analysis of Japanese growth accounting inclusive of capital services compared to that 
of other developed countries, Fukao et al find the most egregious difference in the 
contribution of non-IT capital services to overall growth.  When decomposed at the industry 
level, the researchers find that (non-IT) services industries are the largest offenders.61   
One important hypothesis arising analysis by Fukao, Miyagawa et al. was that the low 
comparative productivity witnessed in services sectors is most likely attributable to “excessive 
regulation and a lack of competition in service sectors” which in turn “seem to have impeded 
introduction of ICT in service industries”.62   
Hypothesis: excessive regulation + poor asset allocation = poor TFP growth 
This hypothesis motivated industry-level fixed effects panel analyses by Fink in 2016, which 
found that both deregulation and greater allocation to innovative capital were consistent with 
TFP growth in the services sector (both IT and non-IT services sectors).63  The period of 
analysis of regulation and productivity (1978 to 1998) were inclusive both of the globalisation 
and accompanying deregulation of manufacturing as well as of “Big Bang” reforms.  
Deregulation may work for highly regulated services, up to a point 
Nonetheless, Fink is unable to generalise the result to the entire economy; the regulation 
coefficient inverts for highly deregulated manufacturing; a marginal decrease in regulation is 
consistent with a drop, not a rise in manufacturing productivity.  Fink’s findings suggest that 
deregulation may be consistent with a rise in TFP up to a certain point, beyond which 
deregulation may not help.   
In a subsequent panel regression, Fink finds that a firm’s investment in innovative capital (a 
subset of intangible capital) tends to be consistent with rising productivity across most 
sectors. 64  
Productivity during the Koizumi administration  
Taking a look at cycle-adjusted total factor productivity (adjusted for quality of labor and 
capital), Total Factor productivity growth was positive over most of the Koizumi administration 
(2001-2006), surging in 2007 before falling prey to a steep decline amid the global financial 





                                                 
61 (Fukao, Miyagawa, et al. 2012) p. 19.  Miyagawa et al single out Distribution Services, 
finance and business services and personal and social services as under-performing 
industries in terms of capital services input growth. 
62 Ibid, p. 1 
63 (Fink, 2016) 
64 Ibid, p. 18 
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Financial sector productivity 
Separately, it may be observed that total factor productivity growth in the financial sector 
accelerated in the early years of the Koizumi administration, but the improvement was 
temporary.  The sector subsequently succumbed to a decline in 2004, as Japanese banks 
deleveraged.  Nevertheless, financial sector productivity troughed in the midst of the Global 
Financial Crisis, even as productivity in both manufacturing and other services sectors 
underwent a steep slump: 
 
Did deregulation help recovery in Japanese financial sector productivity? 
It is possible that 
deregulation, starting with 
the “Big Bang” and 
extending into the Koizumi 
era were responsible in 
part for the rise in 
cyclically adjusted 
productivity in the financial 
sector from the late 1990’s 
into the early 2000’s, as 









Figure 31: TFP growth - Overall, Financial Services 
 Source: JIP Database, Europacifica 
 
Figure 32: TFP (indexed) in Services vs Finance 
Source: JIP Database, Europacifica 
 
Figure 33: Regulation and TFP growth in Financial Services 
Source: JIP Database, Cabinet Office, Europacifica 
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High intangible investment: positive for financial services productivity: 
As Fukao, Miyagawa and Hisa note, the financial industry was one of those industries in 
which the ratio of intangible investment to gross value added (GVA) is highest, and in which 
the ratio of innovative property to GVA (consistent with TFP growth (Fink, 2016) was also 
highest (Figure 34).  Consistent with the idea that deregulation may be consistent with better  
capital allocation; the financial industry raised its investment in intangibles in the wake of the 




Figure 34: Components of Spending on Intangibles by Industry (2008) 
Source: (Fukao, Hisa, & Miyagawa, 2012) 
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Table 1: Expenditure on Intangibles/GVA Ratio by Industry   Source: (Fukao, Hisa, & Miyagawa, 2012) 
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Caveat: financial intermediation shocks a bottleneck for other sectors 
However, it may also be demonstrated that shocks to balance sheets of financial sector firms were also 
responsible for “lost decade” dynamics (Muto, Sudo, & Yoneyama, 2016), dulling the intermediation 
function of financial intermediaries and prompting inefficient allocation of firm balance sheets.   
In light of these results the resolution of the Japanese financial crisis under Koizumi is at least likely to 
have contributed positively to productivity; we lastly demonstrate that the dip in productivity and output 
following the 2008 Lehman shock follows the “news shock” pattern (Beaudry & Portier, 2006), where 
expectations are encapsulated in stock prices (“news shocks”) rather than policy shocks, which in turn 
may influence business cycles short-term.   
“News shocks” of GFC greater than Koizumi impact on TFP 
We run an orthogonalised VAR (4) on quarterly Japanese TFP growth (Solow residual, using similar 
methodology to Fink (2015)), examining two shocks – one to TFP and the other to stock prices.  When we 
observe the 5-quarter lagged negative “news shock” to TFP (upper right corner), we note that the “news 
shock” for the entire data set is greater than the data set prior to the GFC.  Conversely, we note that the 
lagged impact of the news shock is little changed in the data sets before (1972 – 2001) and after Koizumi 
(1972-2008), but before the GFC.  We achieve the similar results if we set the ‘Koizumi’ period to 2006 
(implementation of the reform packages).   The results argue that it is more likely the GFC shock rather 
than policy failure that motivated the subsequent slump in TFP and thus in output. 
 
Figure 35: Impulse Response Functions for Japan "News Shocks" 
     Source: Europacifica 
Empirical basis of policy recommendation (see Section 3): Koizumi’s policy of tokku or “special 
zones” (experimental zones where policy was relaxed) while hailed by APEC in 2006 as an “innovative 
solution” appeared to fade into obscurity until revived under Abenomics.  The policy was not viewed as a 
success in retrospect.  Apart from the obvious difficulties involved with preventing regulatory arbitrage in 
the absence of capital controls, government-led “innovation zones” may not have addressed the right 
problems. 
 Draft Report: Lessons from Koizumi-era financial sector reforms  
Failure of this policy might have had more to do with a poor understanding of the relationship between 
regulation and productivity, which varies between sectors.  Results obtained by Miyagawa and Hisa 
(2013) and again by in Fink (2016) demonstrate that policies designed to promote growth via intangible 
investment in services sector in the early 2000’s may have been misplaced.  Increasing intangible capital 
alone has proven no indicator of rising TFP in the services sector. Per results obtained by Fink (2016), 
incentives designed both at once to decrease “dead weight capital” as well as to increase investment in 
innovative capital (a subset of intangible investment) might prove more appropriate; meanwhile, as Fink 
(2016) demonstrated, deregulation can only go so far.    
Meanwhile, corporate governance is one major determinant of capital allocation in a market-determined 
economy (see Appendix 2).  Further empirical analysis on characteristics of “good corporate governance” 
could complement existing analysis on productivity.  Development of trackable metrics at firm and 
industry level would be desirable. 
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Appendix 2 – Outline of contemporary issues surrounding corporate governance 
What constitutes good corporate governance?  This is one of the most currently pressing topics in the 
APEC region, as well as for investors in global financial markets.   In a general economic sense, good 
governance should aspire to efficient allocation of limited resources as to maximise the profits of the firm, 
which if generalised, should lead to higher productivity growth for the economy.   
For many regional stakeholders however, an important related question is whether good governance 
necessarily follows the model of shareholder primacy, characteristic of American-led financial 
globalisation? 
If the answer is yes, this puts the traditional Japanese model of administrative guidance (gyōsei shido) at 
odds with global best practices.  Yet expecting political, bureaucratic or private sector leaders in Japan, 
all those with vested interests in their model of “bargained-for, negotiated policymaking and 
implementation by reciprocal consent”65 to summarily abandon it is irredeemably naïve and thus doomed 
to failure.  To differing extents, this may many states in the East Asian region, in which there is a higher 
level of involvement by the public sector than in Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies, face the same 
quandary. 
It is useful, for the purpose of developing Japanese corporate governance best practice, to assume that 
“good corporate governance” may still exist without strict shareholder primacy. The example of Koizumi 
however has shown us that despite widespread resistance within the governing LDP toward deregulation, 
privatisation and free-market principles, a place may be made for them within the Japanese model, even 
though finding it will inevitably involve compromise. 
To generalise, vested interests are powerful, yet ongoing economic stagnation will repeatedly invite 
questioning of the status quo, particularly given increasing globalisation of the political economy.  
Likewise, we would expect variants of the process of finding a “middle ground” to be present in many East 
Asian economies. Japan, as the second-largest economy in the region and home of the largest stock 
market by capitalisation, might have a considerable say in the debate over corporate governance, if only 
its large institutional investors (such as public pension funds) would engage in the debate.   
APEC economies may benefit from lessons learned by Japan (both positive and negative) in the search 
for alternatives to US-style shareholder capitalism, in the attempt to balance unique inherent structural 
factors with need for greater market-driven financial sector efficiencies.   Some of the pivotal topics in the 
debate are framed, as follows: 
Why the focus on corporate governance?  
According to Nicholas Benes of the Board of Directors Training Institute,  
                                                 
65 Haley as quoted in (Hook 2005), p.5 
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The main reason why the Japanese economy is sluggish is because Japanese companies do not 
withdraw from unprofitable operations and/or engage in sufficient industry consolidation, and as a 
result corporate assets are not reallocated to their best uses.66 
As described above, total factor productivity growth is the main driver of growth in Japan.  APEC cites 
findings by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) that “reforms to private sector governance and competition 
policy have a positive impact on total factor productivity… a key determinant of economic growth.”  In the 
context of empirical analysis presented in Appendix 1, the combination of deregulation and better capital 
allocation conducive to greater productivity in the services sector might best be served by improving the 
capital-allocating function of firms themselves.  This may be done by improving corporate governance.  
Why do investors expect Anglo-Saxon governance norms (of shareholder primacy)? 
As demonstrated in Appendix 4 (below), US households (either singularly or due to pension savings 
programmes) tend to have a greater bias toward equities than their OECD counterparts in Asia.  Although 
the US is a net external debtor, the institutional savings pool in the US is massive.  According to OECD 
figures, US pension savings constituted almost 60% of pension savings in the OECD.  Pension funds in 
the US tend to be particularly activist, having their say in corporate governance reforms. 
One example of a large institutional activist investor is Calpers (the California Public Employees 
Retirement System).  Calpers sees proxy voting as “the primary way [Calpers] can influence a company’s 
operations and corporate governance.”  Calpers publicly post their “Statement of Investment Policy for 
Global Governance” which clearly state expectations on “shareowner rights, board quality and diversity, 
executive compensation, corporate responsibility, and market conduct”.   Calpers also clearly states that, 
“[i]n instances where companies fail to meet the standards of conduct defined by our Global Principles, 
CalPERS may file shareowner proposals to achieve governance reforms. 67   
Separately, over 40% of world market capitalisation (of listed companies) resides in the US, another 
reason why expectation setting for shareholders is 
dominated by the US model. 
Within Asia, many regional economies have made 
strides in improving corporate governance, to the 
satisfaction of global institutional investors.  
Regional economies in which corporate 
governance is considered to be strong include 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Others such as 
Malaysia, Thailand and India have shown 
improvements in recent years. 68   Many of these 
economies experienced inflows into their stock 
markets following the withdrawal of Japanese 
bank loans at the time of the Japanese banking 
crisis. 
                                                 
66 see: https://bdti.or.jp/en/blog/en/proposals-for-raising-productivity-in-japan-by-nicholas-benes/ 
67 see https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/governance/proxy-voting 
68 ACGA; see http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/CG_Watch_2014_Key_Charts_Extract.pdf 
 
Figure 36: Composition of world market capitalisation 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges 
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Who could be catalysts for change in this model? 
Japan’s pension market accounts for roughly 6% of the total OECD pension pool (a large part of which 
resides in Japan’s mammoth Government Pension Investment Fund), the second largest within the 
OECD.  Presently, the GPIF outsources its proxy voting to fund managers (under periodic supervision), 
though there have been discussions of bringing the corporate governance function in-house.  Greater 
activism from the GPIF could be one marginal catalyst for a “middle way” between more shareholder-
centric US-style governance and the traditional stakeholder model.  Liberalisation of the Chinese capital 
account would be another large catalyst for change in this mix.  The ongoing review of Chinese equities’ 
inclusion in the MSCI indices highlights the importance of global market standards in the 
internationalisation of the Chinese bourse.  
Are hostile takeovers necessary for “good corporate governance”? 
One of the central debates dividing Japanese and Anglo-Saxon modes of governance concerns the role 
of hostile takeovers.  As shown in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, hostile takeovers tend to carry a stigma in 
consensus-loving Japan, while in the liberal market economy model favoured by the US, they represent 
discipline that investors efficiently mete out to corporate managers as to optimise the management of 
scarce resources.   Research in the legal field is divided on the matter.  Dore (2007) proposes an 
alternative framework in Japan that would facilitate takeovers in a more consensus-driven fashion.  
Meanwhile, Puchniak (2009) suggests that viewing hostile takeovers as symptomatic of efficient 
corporate governance is a “dubious assumption”.  Milhaupt (2011) provides a comparative summary of 
hostile takeover practices around the world, and suggests that emerging market governance could learn 
from the Japanese approach to its own “hybrid” takeover policy, which remains a work in progress.   
Do cross shareholdings preclude hostile takeovers? 
As footnoted in section 2.5, the hostile takeover debate is related, but not interchangeable with the 
argument of reduction in cross-shareholdings.  Although the latter presents systemic risks, as seen during 
Japan’s financial crisis and their decline may create greater opportunities for hostile takeovers, there is 
evidence against the argument that absence of hostile takeovers owes primarily to cross-shareholdings.  
(Kim and Sung 2009) 
How important are outside directors? 
Although the presence of independent directors cannot prevent corporate misdeeds, their participation 
may be crucial in challenging management decisions that could be damaging to company prospects.  As 
such, the inclusion of stricter compliance pressures under Japan’s Stewardship Code to appoint one or 
more independent directors is a step forward, noting that in 2012, the industry federation (Keidanren) 
successfully lobbied against its inclusion in updates to Company Law.69  
 
                                                 
69 See https://bdti.or.jp/en/blog/en/jefferies-naomi-fink-unrevolutionary-governance/ for a review of some 
aspects of 2012 policy see. 
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Proposed metrics for improvement of overall governance 
As noted in section 3, Haidar and Hoshi propose the use of the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings to 
measure and propose improvements to governance in Japan.70  Overall, Japan ranks 24 out of 34 OECD 
countries and 34 globally (out of 189).   One of the ranking metrics is “protection of minority investors” in 
which Japan ranked #36 out of 198 worldwide, down from #33 in 2015.  There is clearly room for 
improvement; that Japan however ranks much lower in “starting a business” (#81), “getting credit” (#79) 
and Trading Across Borders (#52) suggests that there may be more pressing industry-improving reforms 
than legislation of hostile takeovers.  There remains room however for development of additional metrics 
dealing with best corporate governance practices in Japan. 
Stewardship code: one step forward, but further ground to be covered 
In light of Japan’s deep-seated reticence toward hostile takeovers, historically passive institutional 
investors and recent resistance to appointment of external directors, the Stewardship Code recently put 
forward by the Abe administration is a big step forward. Nicholas Benes of the Board of Directors Training 
Institute (BDTI) suggests that raising awareness about corporate governance is an important precursor to 
governance-boosting legislation.  One metric useful in tracking the priority of corporate governance is the 
search frequency of the term “corporate 
governance” in Japanese.  Benes points out that 
interest dropped after Koizumi left office but 
revived with the advent of the Stewardship code 
(see Figure 37: Indicator of Corporate 
Governance awareness, Japan). 
PM Abe has but laid the foundations for further 
work on a more cohesive set of guiding 
principles for Japanese corporate governance.  
The role of “gaiatsu” in promoting domestic 
reform, redux 
Although it may be unrealistic to assume that 
Japan will conform unconditionally to a US-style 
model of shareholder primacy, there is a role for foreign trade partners in pushing for improved 
governance (even if ultimately “improved” does not imply “American”).  The American Chamber of 
Commerce in Japan highlights the absence of corporate governance or proxy voting principles at Japan’s 
largest pension fund and urges GPIF to “set a good example of modern pension fund management and 
stewardship for other pension funds in Japan”, to officially recognise the Stewardship code (to which 
GPIF is signatory) as well as the importance of corporate governance in its investment principles (which it 
has yet to do).71  
                                                 
70 (Haidar & Hoshi, 2015) 
71 (The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan 2016) 
  
Figure 37: Indicator of Corporate Governance awareness, Japan 
Source: Google, BDTI 
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GPIF: recommending a greater voice in Japanese governance  
To capitalise on the stewardship code, we recommend that the GPIF assume more active leadership in 
shaping a Japanese approach to corporate governance.  This may be done not only via proxy voting but 
also by clearly stating its principles regarding key issues in governance (similarly to Calpers), also 
participating in regional fora on the topic.  As a first step, we recommend that GPIF adopt a more formal 
Statement of policy for corporate governance to supplement its existing Investment Principles72. 
 
  
                                                 
72 see http://www.gpif.go.jp/en/about/pdf/investment_principles.pdf 
 Draft Report: Lessons from Koizumi-era financial sector reforms  
Appendix 3 – Significant updates to FIEL and the New Corporations Act 
FIEL 
• In March 2008 (one year after promulgation) the FSA submitted a bill to revise FIEL.  Amendments 
included: 
o Diversification of ETFs, 
o Creation of markets oriented toward professional investors 
o Revision of firewall regulations among securities firms, banks and insurance companies, with 
a broadening of scope for banks and insurance groups. 
o Broadening of scope of listed investment trusts (ETF’s) to invest directly in commodities. 
• In 2011 (effective 2012), registration requirements were relaxed for investment management 
businesses dealing exclusively with professional clients. 
• In 2013, the Diet approved the revised Financial Instruments Exchange Act and Act on Investment 
Trust and Investment Corporations, reviewing disclosure regulations for investment trusts (tightening) 
and introducing new products covered in the REITs market, including J-REITS in existing insider 
trading regulation and removing barriers to investments in overseas real estate (loosening).73  
• Japan is moving toward IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) as specified by IASB 
(International Accounting Standards Board). In 2010, internationally active companies have been able 
to voluntarily adopt IFRS.   Given few companies voluntarily adopted the standard, requirements were 
relaxed in 2013. 
• In 2013, there were major reforms to insider trading regulations, driven by abuse of privileged 
information around secondary offerings (capital increases).  Regulations around communicating 
sensitive information and recommending transactions were introduced, and monetary penalties for 
violation were stiffened. 
 
Corporations Law 
• MOJ Legislative Council started work on revision of the Corporate Law in 2010. 
• A bill to amend the act was put to the Diet in 2013 and approved in June 2014.  Key issues 
addressed in the amendment were relevant to corporate governance, including: 
o New regulations on procedures and disclosure designed to deter abusive cash-out (squeeze-
out) of minority shareholders 
o Injunction against fundamental changes to the corporate structure (with similar motivation to 
minority shareholder protection) 
o Regulation over large share placements (again to mitigate conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders) 
o Expansion of scope of liability to be pursued by derivative action (to increase minority 
shareholder rights). 
o Addition of a third option for the governance of large, public companies – to set up an “audit 
and supervisory committee” dominated by outside directors and no statutory auditor, under 
which 74 
• One notable recommendation by the Legislative Council – the mandatory appointment of at least one 
outside director - was blocked by Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) in 2012. 
 
  
                                                 
73 see (Japan Investment Trusts Association, 2015) 
74 Previously, the two available options were either a two-board system with the board of directors plus a 
board of statutory auditors or (alternatively), a three-committee board of directors (dominated by outside 
directors) in charge of nomination, audit and remuneration. 
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Appendix 4 – checkered results for “from savings to investment” policies 
Koizumi’s “from savings to investment” policy pillar enjoyed some certain success: between 2005 and 
2010, the ratio of Japanese savings to investment did, in fact decline, and that ratio remains the lowest 
among many of its East Asian neighbours. 
Still, whatever the instigators, Japanese households remain staunchly conservative in their allocation of 
financial assets by developed country 
standards.  In comparison to American 
households, who invest 45.2% of their funds in 
securities and only 51.9% in cash deposits, 
Japanese households still invested 81.4% of 
their funds in cash deposits, insurance funds 
and pension funds as of 2013, with only 14.5% 
of their funds in securities (including 
toushin).75 
As Figure 40: Japanese vs US Household 
Balance sheets shows, the Japanese 
household held half of its balance sheet 
(including insurance funds, pensions and other 
financial assets) in cash as of 2014; American 
households, in contrast hold only 13% in cash.  
Investment in equities is a far greater 
proportion of US household balance sheets 
(nearly one-third) as opposed to only 8% of 
Japanese household balance sheets.  
Remarking the relevance of equity share as 
indicative of risk preferences, we calibrate 
OECD risk preferences (Figure 43: Risk 
preferences in the OECD) and find that 
Japanese investors are one of the most risk-
averse in the OECD.  This is a poor testimony 
to the success of “from savings to investment”.  
Part of this has been due to risk-aversion and 
valuation surrounding the global financial 
crisis.  As Figure 41: Japanese household 
balance sheet shows, there was a drop in 
household shareholdings between 2005 and 
2010.  However, that there was no rebound 
between 2010 and 2012 (the first year of 
“Abenomics”, a good year for equities) is 
symptomatic of high risk-aversion. 
                                                 
75 (Japan Securities Research Institute 2014) 
 
Figure 38:  Decline in Japanese savings/investment ratio 
 
Figure 39: Comparative savings/investment ratios in Asia 
Source: ADBi 
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Unless there is risk reallocation, demographics do not favour growth in Japanese household stock 
investments; the Tokyo stock exchange reports that the number of individual shareholders has been 
stangnant since around 2009 (Figure 42: Number of Individual Shareholders, Japan) the year the 
Japanese population started to shrink.  
Conversely, the market for investment trusts (toushin) has expanded, and may soon occupy a similar 
place on the Japanese household balance sheet as in the US.  Responsible in part for the rise may have 
been increasing deregulation around this market, with ongoing enhancements to FIEL (see Appendix 3). 
 






Figure 41: Japanese household balance sheet  
Source: Bank of Japan’s, JSRI 
 
Figure 42: Number of Individual Shareholders, 
Japan 
Source: JPX  
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Figure 43: Risk preferences in the OECD 
Source: Europacifica Consulting 
 
Figure 44: Growth in the Toushin market 
Source: Japan Investment Trust Association 
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Appendix 5: Japanese financial sector reform and regulation in historical context 
Immobilist tendencies postwar: Despite the political and economic upheaval of the 20th 
century, Japan has demonstrated strong resistance to institutional change.   Some experts 
argue that revolutionary institutional change in Japan last took place in the late 1800’s, with 
the Meiji Restoration. James Malcolm’s Financial Globalisation and the Opening of the 
Japanese Economy (2001) provides a comprehensive review of the history of Japanese 
financial regulation, up to the time of Japan’s “Big Bang” reforms of the 1990’s.  As Malcolm 
points out, occupational reforms to Japan’s financial sector following the Second World War 
were superficially new but strongly shaped by pre-war institutional and regulatory structures.  
Key characteristics of the system included a bias toward indirect financing, low levels of 
explicit legal codification and indirect state involvement in private sector activities.76  Malcolm 
argues that Japan’s adoption of the US banking system post-war was essentially cosmetic; its 
main legacy was Article 65 of Japan’s Securities and Exchange Law (based on the US Glass-
Steagal Act, separating the activities of banks and securities businesses).  
The overt public sector direction of private sector assets during wartime merely went 
underground postwar, with the government retaining significant influence over the allocation 
of private capital. Government involvement in the banking system took both direct and indirect 
forms.  Government patronage of the four main banks at the centre of financial-industrial 
conglomerates (or zaibatsu) is an example of the latter.  Direct assistance from the Bank of 
Japan to troubled firms (via madoguchi shidō or window guidance) exemplified the former.   
Conversely, no support was offered to stock markets, which as a result remained volatile and 
underdeveloped for many years.  As a result, individual investors preferred either postal 
deposits (with an explicit government guarantee) or bank deposits (with an implicit 
government guarantee).  The bias toward cash deposits on household balance sheets exists 
to this day; cash accounts for nearly half of Japan’s 1.2 quadrillion yen in household assets, 
while investments in stocks accounted for less than 10% as of 2013 year-end, a low 
percentage in comparison with the OECD average. 
This is not to say that the system was devoid of competition, specialisation or development of 
economies of scale.   Instead however, a heavily structured and segmented financial system 
took shape in the early 20th century.  Divisions of financial activities were based on functions 
of client institutions rather than size or financial product.  This segmentation of the financial 
sector, on one hand, contributed to its stability for many years; on the other hand, these 
structural characteristics were – and remain – extremely resistant to change.   
On the other hand, rigid segmentation by client function created market distortions.  While 
suppressing competition between segments of the financial sector, segmentation gave rise to 
fierce intra-segment competition.  As a result, many firms resorted to non-price means of 
competition, which led to market distortions.   
Gyōsei shido (administrative guidance) as principal regulatory tool: The primary 
financial rule-maker and enforcer in postwar Japan was the Ministry of Finance (MOF), whose 
main tool was extrajudicial “administrative guidance” or gyōsei shido.  Banking laws of the 
early 20th century had been kept purposefully vague to confer maximum benefits to 
government-directed financial support to industrial-financial conglomerates (zaibatsu); 
postwar reforms failed to strengthen the rule of law and in this respect, ensured that the 
Ministry of Finance remained the sole interpreter of Japan’s legal code. Via shingikai (or 
administrative committees), the Ministry of Finance exercised hawk-eyed supervision over 
                                                 
76 (Malcolm 2001) 
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financial institutions and the development of new financial products in order to preserve the 
existing division of labor and allocation of assets.   
The prevalent institutional structure was an “escorted convoy method” (gosōsendan 
hōshiki)77, over which the MOF reigned virtually uncontested, using branch and licensing 
resrictions to slow the pace of leading firms and the threat of forced mergers to hurry the 
development of lagging firms.78  Its main regulatory vehicles were shingikai or oversight 
committees, who engaged in ex ante monitoring.  Although this structure ensured a significant 
degree of diversification of financial intermediaries, it also contributed to the rigidity of the 
system, with little incentive to innovate, with conservative guidance hemming in the 
distribution of new financial products (and thus discouraging their development).   The original 
rule of thumb was “no rule means prohibition”.79 
Although the convoy method worked well when Japan was developing and mobilising 
resources, by the time the economy reached maturity in the 1970’s, the drawbacks of the 
system had started to outweigh the benefits.  A spate of industry consolidation in the 1960’s 
demonstrated that asset allocation was of greater importance to economic growth than asset 
mobilisation alone; efficiency of asset allocation began to matter much more than before.  No 
longer a mere tool to prevent monopoly power, the convoy system contributed to the 
misallocation of financial resources, thanks in part to the practice of amakudari (dispatch of 
MOF retirees to private sector firms). Unwilling to damage post-retirement prospects, active 
MOF officials of the 1970’s had clear incentives to discourage consolidation, also to cave into 
political pressures to oppose hostile takeovers of clearly inefficient firms.   
Arguably, by this point, the damage to market mechanisms had been done.  Generations of 
negative associations with and political incentives to oppose hostile takeovers left a strong 
social imprint.  Despite subsequent reforms that gradually eroded the unilateral rulemaking 
power of the MOF, opposition to hostile takeovers of firms had become deeply ingrained, and 
persists to this day. 
1970’s - Globalisation was mostly one-way: Deregulation of Japan’s bond markets in the 
1970’s conformed to APEC’s description of externally motivated structural reform.  The 
breakdown of Bretton Woods contributed pressures for yen revaluation and overhaul of 
Japan’s foreign exchange controls.  Meanwhile, the escalating pace of financial globalisation 
manifested in the rapid expansion of the eurodollar market, which in turn contributed to the 
weakening of the rigid rate structure prevalent until the late 1970’s. 
                                                 
77 Alternatively gosōsendanteki gyousei (or convoy-based group administration)  
78 (Malcolm 2001), p.67-68; Malcolm notes that the MOF enjoyed an unusually broad 
regulatory mandate within the OECD, exercising powers usually shared between central 
banks and branches of national or local government.  Instead of overt checks and balances, 
conflicting mandates within the MOF, interministry competition and vested political interests 
(such as powerful lobbies among regional Post Office employees and agricultural groups) 
exercised a type of “organic” check to the MOF’s power.   
79 Ibid; Characteristics of Japanese postwar regulation and the MOF’s role in interpretation of 
a skeletal legal code are somewhat reminiscent of Chinese financial regulation currently 
undergoing reform within Shanghai’s Free Trade zone, where liberalisation includes 
introduction of a “negative list” of prohibited activities in place of blanket prohibition of 
activities not expressly permitted. 
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As Malcolm (2001) emphasises, reforms of this period however were reactive and 
piecemeal.80 Moreover, even after some degree of internationalisation, the convoy system 
was very much intact.   
As a result, although Japanese banks were heavy participants in the eurodollar market, flows 
tended to be one-way and the playing field was far from level.  As Japanese industry found a 
foothold overseas, their main banks accompanied them by opening branch offices, 
intermediating “foreign” financing in foreign currencies.  Conversely however, foreign players 
were still largely excluded from domestic banking operations in Japan.   
Even despite significant consolidation and restructuring in the Japanese banking system 
since the 1970’s, domestic banking operations to this day remain dominated by Japanese 
banks.  Moreover, outward foreign direct investment (undertaken now by Japanese 
nonfinancial firms and large banks in foreign markets) by far exceeds inward investment.  
Otherwise stated, “internationalisation” of Japanese markets has remained mostly one-way. 
1980’s – Gaiatsu as an effective driver of domestic policy reform: In the 80’s, Japan 
began to face the two opposing pressures of harmonisation with accelerating financial 
globalisation and conservation of its traditional financial model, pressures which persist to this 
day. 
Substantial deregulation in the 1980’s, driven greatly by developments abroad and foreign 
pressure (or gaiatsu) for reform, changed the financial scenery but failed to shift the 
underlying institutional structure, to disastrous ends.   
Under pressure from the Reagan Administration as trade surpluses burgeoned, Japan’s New 
Banking Law of 1981 claimed to espouse harmonisation to OECD standards in opening the 
banking system and treatment of foreign firms in Japan.  In reality however, banking reform 
remained very much dictated by the MOF’s administrative guidance, under which the rigid 
structure of Japan’s domestic banking system remained little changed.81  
Still, external pressures had a hand in propelling a number of market-opening reforms to 
implementation; pressures from the Reagan Administration culminated in the Yen-Dollar 
agreement of 1983. 82    
Under PM Nakasone (1982-1987), the government consulted private advisory groups of 
professionals and academics, culminating in the Maekawa report of 1986, in which three of 
six proposals for industry deregulation related to financial sector reforms. The implementation 
of the Plaza Accord in 1985 to restrain further appreciation of the dollar cemented this period 
of externally driven change, as Finance Minister Takeshita voluntarily proposed a 10% 
appreciation in the yen.  In 1989, the US and Japan began the bilateral Structural 
Impediments Initiative, mostly designed to address economic policies and business practices 
in Japan perceived by the US as barriers to exports and investment83. At least superficially, it 
appeared as though gaiatsu achieved every success in motivating domestic reform. 
As a result, the structure of Japan’s manufacturing sector underwent fundamental change, 
with corporations relocating facilities (as well as revenues) overseas.  Banks’ overseas 
                                                 
80 (Malcolm 2001) 
81 (Shimojo 1982) 
82 The Reagan administration came forward with a formal list of demands to PM Nakasone for 
Japanese reform, which culminated in the Yen-Dollar accord of 1983, committing Japan to 
financial services reform.   
83 (Posen and Changyong 2013), p. 25  
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operations and revenues surged alongside those of their principal customers.  As outward 
FDI surged, the contribution of export revenues to the current account decreased, as 
investment income increased. 
Nevertheless, the combination of incomplete deregulation in Japan (recalling that the MOF 
still held iron-fisted autonomy over domestic financial infrastructure) combined with the 
reactive – and hence delayed – nature of Japan’s market-opening measures ultimately led to 
market failure and crisis. 
1990 - Regulatory arbitrage, bubble, bust:  However effective foreign pressure may have 
been in speeding up market-opening measures, it was ineffective in completing market 
reform.  Not only did the rigid domestic market structure remain in place (under the MOF’s 
strict administrative guidance) but it was incapable of competing with newly liberalised and 
globalised markets in the US and UK.  Meanwhile, market opening measures in the absence 
of macroprudential regulations or administrative reform created inefficiencies for domestic 
monetary policy.  As the yen strengthened, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) cut rates, attempting to 
follow the examples of the Federal Reserve and Bank of England in fighting currency strength 
in the mid-1980’s.  It is possible that the BOJ had miscalculated the effects of yen 
appreciation; current account surpluses in the mid-80 have remained intact (in contrast to 
persistent US and UK external deficits) even as private capital poured out of Japan (with little 
concern for investment risks) into “cheaper” foreign markets.    The BOJ’s drastic cuts 
meanwhile gave rise to double-digit growth in the Japanese money supply in the late 1980’s, 
fuelling a bubble in stock and 
property markets.   
Paradoxically, the veneer of 
success projected by booming 
markets relieved both domestic and 
foreign pressure for ongoing 
regulatory reform.  Housing 
affordability plunged even as the 
inflation rate remained firmly below 
5%.  The central bank, fearing its 
reaction function well and truly 
broken, aggressively hiked rates 
from a low of 2.25% in 1987 to 6% 
in 1990, piercing the property and 
stock bubbles.  The immediate 
result was a simultaneous sell-off in 
Japanese stocks, property and 
bonds – an enormous destruction of 
domestic wealth.  The mid-term 
consequence was domestic 
financial crisis.  Long-term, the 
subsequent surge in depreciation 
costs and plunge in productivity 
heralded the start of Japan’s “lost 
decades” of growth, from which 
Japan has yet to recover. 
 
Figure 45: Japan's Big Bang 
Legislation 
• Commenced in November 1996 under principles “free, fair 
and global” with aims to compete with New York and 
London 
• Foreign Exchange Law adjustment in 1998, totally 
liberalizing cross-border transactions. 
• Revisions to Banking Law, the Securities and Exchange Law, 
and the Insurance Business Law enforced in Dec 1998 as 
Financial System Reform Law 
Key reforms 
• Asset management: introduction of new investment trusts, 
over-the-counter sales of investment trusts by banks and other 
financial institutions; liberalization of dealings in securities 
derivatives 
• Inter-sector competition: switching from the licensing system 
to a registration system for securities companies, fully 
liberalizing brokerage commissions, scrapping obligatory use 
of premium rates set by the non-life insurance ratings agencies 
• Diversifying markets and channels for fund raising: 
permitted off-exchange stock trading and electronic trading 
systems.  Tokyo Stock Exchange establishes MOTHERS, a 
new market for start-up firms 
• Disclosure and transparency: fair trading rules (stricter 
insider trading control, protection against bank failure).  From 
March 1999: financial institutions required by law to disclose 
information on non-performing assets, under standards based 
on those set by the US SEC 
Source: (Japan Financial Services Agency 2000) 
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1990’s – “Big Bang” undermined by crisis; MOF authority lingers: Market failure and 
banking crisis, exacerbated by insider trading and loss-compensating scandals in the 
1990’s84 revived calls for administrative reform.  A plan was formulated by the Hashimoto 
administration in 1996 that culminated in the “Big Bang” financial reforms.   
The “Big Bang” reforms were put forward to the Diet in 1998 as the Financial System Reform 
Law.  The reforms were heralded as the “most extensive revamping of the Japanese 
Financial System since the end of World War II”.85  Alongside the introduction of new 
products and technologies, reforms promoted de-segmentation of Japan’s financial services 
sector, greater codification and regulatory transparency (see Figure 45: Japan's Big Bang). 
The boldness of the plan lay in its call for the end of the “convoy” system of regulatory 
protection that compelled healthy banks to share the burden of would-be failed institutions.86  
Prospects for true administrative reform had never been greater.   
Nonetheless, the legislation still bore the imprint of the MOF’s shingikai (deliberative 
committees).  Predictably, substantive portions of administrative reform components – such 
as the set-up of Japan’s own version of the US Securities and Exchange Commission and to 
break up the MOF - were ultimately diluted. Upon the creation of the Financial Services 
Agency (FSA) under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet Office in 1998, Planning and Financial 
Policy remained under the MOF umbrella. 
Reforms were not entirely lacking in substance. The revision of the Bank of Japan Law in 
1997 did enhance the central bank’s independence from the central government and policy-
making transparency (Dwyer 2004).  One of the biggest achievements of the Big Bang was 
convergence between the cost of capital in the US and Japan, if temporarily.87  
Yet when put to the test, traditional methods prevailed.  As soon as domestic crisis struck the 
financial sector88, slapping a risk premium on Japanese funding, the MOF was quick to 
backtrack on reforms, resuscitating the interventionist convoy system to keep widespread 
bank failures at bay. Externally, as the Asia crisis roiled regional markets in 1997, major 
regional lenders (the Japanese Banks), saddled with mounting nonperforming loans, were 
powerless to lend support to regional recovery.  The target completion date of 2001 for the 
“Big Bang reforms” was missed.  Meanwhile, comprehensive reform remained elusive as an 
aging demographic, slumping productivity and deflation gripped Japan. 
For Japan, the interruption of Big Bang reforms by domestic banking crisis echoed a recurring 
theme; once again, intended structural reforms, grand in scale and intention, were wound 
back in crisis circumstances.  Expectations for revolutionary changes in Japanese financial 
services and reform-driven resurgence in growth were disappointed.   
Meanwhile, the failure of banks to rapidly dispose of non-performing assets eroded their 
ability to serve as effective arbiters of financial liquidity; even as existing bad loans crowded 
out new lending, banks’ eroding balance sheets posed a threat to their own existence and a 
                                                 
84 Loss-compensating and accounting scandals at Daiwa, Yamaichi Securities and 18 other 
securities companies, the crisis among jūsen (nonbank mortgage lenders) and the 1997 
sōkaiya racketeering scandal underscored the need to update Japan’s commercial code. 
85 (Malcolm 2001), p. 107 
86 (Ito and Melvin 1999) 
87 Ibid 
88 The Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) and Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) failed in 1998.  The 
bank failure put a swift end to LTCB’s asset management joint venture with the Swiss Bank 
Corporation (later UBS).  LTCB was later nationalised. 
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systemic risk to the Japanese financial system.  The shock of Japan’s financial crisis may 
have led firms in the services sector in particular to lag their global counterparts in adopting 
new technology, thereby depressing services sector productivity.  See Appendix 1 for an 
empirical analysis of Japanese productivity. 
Meanwhile, laws remained sufficiently vague as to allow selective interpretation by key 
administrative stakeholders (particularly the MOF).   
Japanese financial reform is cumulative, gradualist and iterative 
On the other hand, the sum of financial services reforms over the postwar period to the time 
of the Big Bang reforms was considerable.  Japan had broken down barriers to international 
financial transactions, liberalised interest rates, updated legal frameworks to accommodate 
new products, and enhanced the functioning of its capital markets.  Market deregulation 
(culminating in the Big Bang) did assist corporations in relying more on capital market 
financing and less on bank loans.89  And by 2001, the MOF’s interventionist power of 
administrative guidance had been diluted, although not fully checked. 
The main lessons from Japan’s postwar history of financial reform are that traditional 
administrative structures have compelled piecemeal and gradualist reform, and as a result 
reform has been a cumulative, iterative process, tending to lag other major global centres 
when responding to financial globalisation.  These are lessons that must be kept in mind 
when evaluating the Koizumi reforms.   
 
  
                                                 
89 (Hoshi and Kashyap, The Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come From and How Will 
It End? 1999) 
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Appendix 6: Current structure of the Japanese financial sector 
The structure of the financial services sector, though no longer rigidly segmented, retains the 
traces of postwar “escorted convoy” system, as may be seen in Figure 46: Structure of the 
Japanese Banking Sector (Source: Zenginkyo). 
We provide further graphics (below) on the composition of overall financing among Japanese 
nonfinancial corporates, noting that bank borrowing comprises less than 30% of corporate 
financing; the balance comes mostly from capital markets or intercompany credit. 
A breakdown of bank financing (loans and discounts) is provided (from Zenginkyo).  It is 
useful to note that services, wholesale and retail sectors together comprise over 20% of 
overall bank lending.  These sectors typically contain many small businesses particularly 
reliant upon bank financing with limited recourse to capital markets.  To provide additional 
detail, we contrast the lagging lending environment among small services sector firms when 
in comparison to large firms.  This is a factor affecting many employers in the Japanese 
economy – with reference to the Bank of Japan’s chart on composition of Japanese firms by 
size.  
Finally, we include the asset management industry, which alongside foreign investors, form 
the market for capital market securities issued by Japanese corporations.  We observe that 
households and pension funds (and among them, the GPIF) are the largest beneficiaries of 





Figure 46: Structure of the Japanese Banking Sector (Source: Zenginkyo) 
Zenginkyo notes that the numbers in parentheses represent number of institutions in each 
category.  The Banking Federation classifies Postal Savings and Insurance as “public 
financial institutions” because they are “in a transition period toward final privatization slated 
for the end of September 2017 at the latest”. Zenginkyo finally notes that the Development 
Bank of Japan, Inc. and The Shoko Chukin Bank, Ltd. are scheduled for sometime during the 
period from 2017 to 2019. 
Further information on the structure of the Japanese banking sector (such as the function of 





Figure 47: Sector breakdown of Bank Loans & Discounts (Source: Zenginkyo) 
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